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Enacted more than sixty years ago, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 682 has never lived up to its promise of “en-
courag[ing] settlements and avoid[ing] protracted litigation.”3 
Yet in recent years, as the popularity of alternative dispute 
resolution waxes, the rule has earned favor among academics.4 
Still, to most practitioners the rule remains a second-class citi-
zen. The rule’s inferior citizenship is well-deserved. Due to its 
ambiguity, Rule 68 often creates more uncertainty, and more 
burdensome litigation, than it resolves. As such, many defen-
dants either avoid it or use it at their peril. 
The problem lies in the lack of definition and clarity in the 
rule itself. The rule, which is the only federal rule of civil pro-
cedure that governs formal settlement offers, is supposed to op-
erate to encourage plaintiffs to “think hard” about accepting 
reasonable settlement offers. Plaintiffs who refuse a Rule 68 of-
fer, and then receive a less favorable outcome at trial, are pe-
nalized; they not only lose their ability to recover their post-
offer costs and applicable attorneys’ fees but also must pay the 
other side’s post-offer costs.5 
In practice, though, the rule’s operation is much less clear. 
Because the rule is cursory in form and does not alert the par-
ties to its many nuances, defendants often are uncertain or 
 
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 3. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 3001, at 66 (2d ed. 1997). 
 4. Daniel Glimcher, Note, Legal Dentistry: How Attorney’s Fees and Cer-
tain Procedural Mechanisms Can Give Rule 68 the Necessary Teeth to Effectu-
ate Its Purposes, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2006). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. For the full text of the rule, see infra note 6.  
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misguided about how to draft a Rule 68 offer. Defendants often 
end up drafting offers that carry unintended consequences. 
Similarly, plaintiffs who receive Rule 68 offers face uncertainty. 
A plaintiff must decide whether to accept or reject a given offer, 
knowing that either decision carries consequences that hinge 
upon how a court will construe the offer or how a court will 
compare the offer to the judgment received at trial. It is not 
surprising that defendants largely avoid the rule and plaintiffs 
decry the rule as unfair. 
Both defendants and plaintiffs are correct in their assess-
ments—the case law is replete with instances in which judges 
have construed Rule 68 offers as something very different from 
what the parties intended to offer or accept. The end result of 
this uncertainty is that cases that would be good candidates for 
Rule 68 settlements are not so settled, and those in which Rule 
68 offers are attempted often result in costly collateral litiga-
tion. A defendant who thinks he is making a lump-sum offer for 
$15,000 ends up being told by the court that in fact he also 
must pay a six-figure attorney fee award. Likewise, a plaintiff 
who thinks she just accepted an offer for $75,000 exclusive of 
attorneys’ fees is surprised to learn from the court—after she 
accepted the offer—that in fact the offer already included such 
fees and thus she cannot recover her six-figure attorneys’ fees 
in addition to the offer. 
It does not have to be this way. The rule can and should be 
amended so that it becomes a predictable and useful tool for 
practitioners to settle cases. This Article focuses on amending 
the primary part of the rule that leads to uncertainty—the Rule 
68 offer. 
Part I provides an overview of the basic features of Rule 
68, including the rule’s purpose. It also describes the compo-
nents of Rule 68 offers and the roles of defendants, plaintiffs, 
and courts in relation to such offers. 
Part II examines the current uncertainty surrounding the 
validity and interpretation of offers under Rule 68. By examin-
ing federal court cases in which Rule 68 is applied, it explores 
uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of such offers. It 
also explores the implications of such uncertainty, including 
the failure of defendants to use the rule, the drafting problems 
when defendants use the rule, the difficulties plaintiffs face in 
evaluating offers, and the resulting collateral litigation. 
Part III proposes an amendment to the rule that would 
provide clarity and predictability to defendants making Rule 68 
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offers and to plaintiffs and courts called upon to evaluate such 
offers. Specifically, it proposes an amendment to the rule that 
would define what must be included in a Rule 68 offer and di-
rect how courts must interpret such offers. Part III devotes par-
ticular attention to amending the rule to eliminate much of the 
current confusion over whether costs and fees are included in 
an offer. 
With this amendment, defense attorneys will understand 
and use the rule without fear. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, too, will be 
on notice as to how courts will construe an offer, and will be 
able to make informed decisions about whether to accept or re-
ject an offer. The end result of such clarity and predictability 
will be not only that Rule 68 offers will be properly made and 
properly assessed, but also that such offers will be enforced 
with only minimal court intervention and limited collateral liti-
gation. With greater certainty in the rule, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68 can begin to live up to its purpose of fostering set-
tlements and promoting judicial economy. 
I.  THE PROMISE OF RULE 68 OFFERS OF JUDGMENT   
A. A PRIMER ON RULE 68 AND ITS PURPOSE 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 686 is the only settlement 
device or federal rule of any kind, that “deals directly with the 
consequences of an unreasonable refusal to settle.”7 Under the 
rule, a defendant may make an offer of judgment to the plain-
 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. The relevant text of the “Offer of Judgment” rule is 
as follows: 
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defend-
ing against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to al-
low judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money 
or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then ac-
crued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party 
serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then 
file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service 
thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not ac-
cepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admis-
sible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally 
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the of-
feree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The 
fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subse-
quent offer. 
Id. 
 7. John E. Sprizzo, Unjustifiable Refusals to Settle and Rule 68, 62 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 443, 443 (1988). 
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tiff, which allows judgment to be taken against the defendant.8 
While the rule requires few formalities, the offer must be for 
damages as well as costs then accrued.9 If the plaintiff accepts 
the offer, judgment is entered for the amount of the offer as a 
matter of course. If, instead, the plaintiff rejects the offer but 
receives less at trial, Rule 68 penalizes the plaintiff by shifting 
all post-offer costs to the plaintiff.10 The penalty is two-fold: the 
plaintiff must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs and the 
plaintiff cannot recover her own post-offer costs.11 These shift-
ing costs can be particularly high in actions in which attorneys’ 
fees are defined as “costs,”12 such that the plaintiff is precluded 
from recovering otherwise applicable attorneys’ fees on a suc-
cessful verdict that is less than the amount of the Rule 68 of-
fer.13 
 
 8. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3002, at 90. By its plain text, Rule 
68 is available only to the party seeking to make an offer, which typically is 
the defendant. Id.  
 9. Id. (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985)); see also Monica 
Wiseman Latin, Note, Avoiding Disaster: The Applicability of Federal Rule 68 
When Multiple Offers of Judgment Result in a Settlement, 12 REV. LITIG. 687, 
696 (1993). 
 10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68; Marek, 473 U.S. at 5. Notably, Rule 68 is not 
triggered if the judgment is in favor of the defendant. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. 
August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981). This result has been criticized on grounds 
that it is arbitrary and contrary to the rule’s purpose. See J. Karen Arnold, 
Note, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August: Taking the Teeth out of Rule 68, 43 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 765, 765 (1982). 
 11. Marek, 473 U.S. at 7. Courts have almost uniformly held that defen-
dants cannot recover their attorneys’ fees as “costs” pursuant to Rule 68. See 
Megan Barbero, Note, Interpreting Rule 68 to Conform with the Rules Ena-
bling Act, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2017, 2025 (2005) (“In sum, the majority of the cir-
cuit courts to have considered the issue have held that the ‘properly award-
able’ language of Marek prohibits defendants from recovering attorney’s fees 
from the plaintiffs as part of Rule 68 costs because either the defendant is not 
the ‘prevailing party,’ or because the suit is not unreasonable or frivolous and 
the underlying statute requires the suit to be so for there to be an award of 
attorney’s fees . . . .”). 
 12. Although in Marek the question before the Court was whether the un-
derlying federal fee-shifting statute defined attorneys’ fees as “costs,” the 
Court made clear that Rule 68’s reference to “costs” applies to “all costs prop-
erly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority.” 473 
U.S. at 9. Thus, under Rule 68, attorneys’ fees are properly treated as part of 
“costs” so long as they are so defined by a federal fee-shifting statute, state fee-
shifting statute, or contract. 13 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 68.02[4], at 68-9 (citing Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson 
Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1027−28 (9th Cir. 2003); Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 
329, 332−34 (1st Cir. 1986)). 
 13. Some commentators have questioned whether Marek’s interpretation 
of “costs” raises implications under the Rules Enabling Act. See Marek, 473 
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Because of Rule 68’s ability to change the financial incen-
tives of pursuing litigation, the rule requires plaintiffs to “think 
hard” before rejecting Rule 68 offers.14 A prototypical case is 
one in which the defendant makes a Rule 68 offer for $100,000 
plus costs then accrued. If the plaintiff accepts the offer, judg-
ment is entered for $100,000 and the plaintiff also may recover 
her costs then accrued. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, and 
then recovers $105,000 at trial, the rule has no consequence. 
The plaintiff recovers the amount of the judgment as well as 
any costs. If, instead, the plaintiff rejects the offer, but recovers 
only $80,000 at trial, the rule is triggered and costs shift. Thus, 
the plaintiff recovers the $80,000 but cannot recover her post-
offer costs and instead must pay the defendant’s post-offer 
costs. This sanction is of particular consequence in fee-shifting 
cases in which the plaintiff ’s claim is one under which “costs” 
are defined to include attorneys’ fees.15 In such cases, the plain-
tiff cannot recover the post-offer attorneys’ fees to which she 
otherwise would have been entitled. 
The often-touted purpose of Rule 68 is “to encourage set-
tlement and avoid litigation.”16 The rule does so by 
“prompt[ing] both parties to a suit to evaluate the risks and 
costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of 
success upon trial on the merits.”17 The rule’s policy of encour-
aging settlement is said to be neutral, “favoring neither plain-
tiffs nor defendants.”18 
 
U.S. at 36 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s interpretation 
of Rule 68 would “surely . . . operate to ‘abridge’ and to ‘modify’ [the] statutory 
right to reasonable attorney’s fees”); Edward H. Cooper, Symposium Reflec-
tions: A Rulemaking Perspective, 57 MERCER L. REV. 839, 845−47 (2006) (dis-
cussing the Rules Enabling Act in the context of revisions to Rule 68); Bar-
bero, supra note 11 (exploring whether Marek’s interpretation of “costs” as 
inclusive of attorneys’ fees defined as costs abridges, enlarges, or modifies a 
plaintiff ’s arguably substantive right to attorneys’ fees). 
 14. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11; see also Richardson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 49 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A] Rule [68 offer] imposes certain 
consequences that can be costly for the [offeree] who declines the offer. The 
Rule is thus designed to put significant pressure on the [offeree] to think hard 
about the likely value of its claim as compared to the [offeror’s] offer.”). 
 15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) (defining fees-as-costs in § 1983 ac-
tions). 
 16. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3001, at 
66. 
 17. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5. 
 18. Id. at 10. 
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Despite the rule’s clear purpose, it is not clear that much 
thought was put into drafting the rule.19 The rule itself is 
rather cursory in form and “has long been among the most en-
igmatic of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”20 Since 1983, 
several proposals have been made to amend Rule 68, but none 
has been adopted.21 Most of these proposals have focused on 
changing the incentives under the current rule22 and stem from 
the widespread belief that the rule is underutilized, unfair, or 
ineffective. Indeed, the anecdotal evidence and empirical re-
search on Rule 68 demonstrates that the rule is used infre-
quently,23 and some research also suggests that the current in-
centives are inadequate to achieve the rule’s purpose.24 
B. THE RULE 68 OFFER: REQUIREMENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
At the core of much litigation involving Rule 68 lies the of-
fer of judgment itself. However, the text of the rule provides lit-
tle guidance as to what an offer must include and how a court 
will interpret it:25 “[A] party defending against a claim may 
 
 19. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3001, at 67. 
 20. Id. at 75 (citing Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 
1986)). 
 21. Indeed, the rule’s substance has not been amended since 1946. See 
MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68 App.01−.04; Anna Aven Sumner, Note, Is 
the Gummy Rule of Today Truly Better than the Toothy Rule of Tomorrow? 
How Federal Rule 68 Should Be Modified, 52 DUKE L.J. 1055, 1055 (2003). In 
contrast, several states have either revised or enacted offer of judgment rules 
in recent years. See JOHN E. SHAPARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LIKELY CONSE-
QUENCES OF AMENDMENTS TO RULE 68, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
25−27 (1995); Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 379, 414 n.245, 422 (1997); Sumner, supra, at 1055 n.3; 
Laura T. Kidwell, Annotation, Construction of State Offer of Judgment Rule—
Sufficiency of Offer and Contract Formation Issues, 118 A.L.R. 91 (2004). 
 22. For example, several proposals involve shifting the defendant’s attor-
neys’ fees, at least in some circumstances. For a history of the proposed 
amendments to Rule 68, see MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68 App.101. 
 23. See, e.g., Glimcher, supra note 4, at 1451−52, 1455 (describing Rule 68 
as “relatively obscure and vastly underutilized”); Symposium, Revitalizing 
FRCP 68: Can Offers of Judgment Provide Adequate Incentives for Fair, Early 
Settlement of Fee-Recovery Cases? Session One: “Background and Federal Ju-
dicial Interpretation of Rule 68,” 57 MERCER L. REV. 743, 757 (2006) (“In 
summary, with some notable exceptions, it appears that Rule 68 is not used 
very much in the very type of cases in which it might be expected to have the 
greatest impact.”). 
 24. See Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Liti-
gation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 155, 158−60 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 
298 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The sole constraint Rule 68 places on 
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serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be 
taken against the defending party for the money or property or 
to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued.”26 
Under well-established case law following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marek v. Chesny, an offer must include 
costs.27 Costs can be included as part of the offer (i.e., the de-
fendant makes a lump-sum offer that is inclusive of costs) or 
costs can be included after the fact (i.e., the defendant makes 
an offer for a certain amount that is not inclusive of costs, thus 
allowing costs to be added later).28 
Once a defendant makes a Rule 68 offer, the offer itself is 
non-negotiable.29 The offeree-plaintiff has only two choices: ac-
cept the offer on its face or reject it. Either way, a plaintiff must 
assess what exactly the offer is, because “a Rule 68 . . . offer has 
a binding effect when refused as well as when accepted.”30 If 
the offer is accepted, Rule 68 operates automatically and with-
out the court’s discretion.31 As such, if the plaintiff accepts the 
offer, the court must enter judgment for the amount specified 
in the offer.32 The court may not second guess the terms of the 
offer, as “[e]ntry of a Rule 68 judgment is ministerial rather 
than discretionary.”33 
 
offers of judgment is its mandate that an offer include ‘costs then accrued.’”). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 27. See 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 28. Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 29. Nusom v. COMH Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 30. Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 31. Id. (“Rule 68 operates automatically, requiring that the clerk ‘shall 
enter judgment’ upon the filing of an offer, notice of acceptance and proof of 
service. This language removes discretion from the clerk or the trial court as 
to whether to enter judgment upon the filing of the accepted offer.” (citing 
Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1279 (6th Cir. 1991))). 
 32. Although the court enters “judgment” on an accepted Rule 68 offer, 
that judgment does not have collateral estoppel implications. See Ian H. 
Fisher, Federal Rule 68, A Defendant’s Subtle Weapon: Its Use and Pitfalls, 14 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 89, 92 (2001) (demonstrating that Rule 68 judgments do not 
have collateral estoppel implications because two of the required elements of 
collateral estoppel—that the issue was “actually litigated” and was “essential” 
to the judgment—are not present). 
 33. Mallory, 922 F.2d at 1279 (“From the foregoing it appears that Rule 
68 judgments are self-executing. Unlike imposed judgments and ordinary con-
sent judgments, once the parties agree on the terms of a Rule 68 judgment, the 
court has no discretion to withhold its entry or otherwise to frustrate the 
agreement.”); see also Fisher, supra note 32, at 105 (“Upon the filing of a Rule 
68 offer . . . , a court must enter judgment . . . as set forth in the offer. A court 
has no discretion . . . .”). 
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If the plaintiff chooses to reject the offer and instead elects 
to proceed to trial, the rule’s cost-shifting mechanism is trig-
gered if “the judgment finally obtained by the [plaintiff] is not 
more favorable than the offer.”34 The cost-shifting mechanism 
is mandatory; under the rule, the plaintiff “must pay the costs 
incurred after the making of the offer.”35 In practice, this 
means that the plaintiff must bear her own post-offer costs 
(that otherwise would be recoverable) and also must pay the 
post-offer costs of the defendant.36 The offer “stands as the 
marker by which the plaintiff ’s results are ultimately meas-
ured.”37 That is, the offer becomes the benchmark a plaintiff 
must surpass at trial to avoid the shifting of costs—both her 
own and those of the defendant—under Rule 68.38 
Further, in comparing the offer and the judgment, a court 
should be mindful that an apples-to-apples comparison be 
made: if the offer includes costs, the judgment amount, too, 
should account for or include costs accrued from the time of the 
offer.39 Because plaintiffs must respond with either acceptance 
or silence to a Rule 68 settlement offer, and because either re-
sponse has consequences,40 one court has reflected that “plain-
tiffs are at their peril whether they accept or reject a Rule 68 
offer.”41 
The question that arises is what constitutes “costs” under 
Rule 68. The rule itself does not define costs but instead adopts 
 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 35. Id. (emphasis added). 
 36. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68.08[2], at 68-55 n.5 (“[A] plaintiff 
who refuses an offer of judgment and later fails to receive a more favorable 
judgment must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs.” (citing O’Brien v. City of 
Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989))). 
 37. Nusom v. COMH Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 38. See, e.g., Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 331−33 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(reading Rule 68 not only to deny a plaintiff who receives a judgment less fa-
vorable than the offer her right to have the defendant pay her costs, but also 
to require the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s post-offer costs). 
 39. This comparison is complicated when costs, at least arguably, include 
attorneys’ fees. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3006.1, at 125 (“Although 
the task of comparison is usually straightforward in cases involving only 
monetary relief, lump-sum offers that combine substantive relief and costs can 
present complications, particularly where costs include attorneys’ fees. . . . 
[C]ourts have recognized that Rule 68 offers that appeared better actually 
were not when costs were added in.”). For a discussion of cases in which courts 
have included attorneys’ fees in measuring costs, see infra Part II.C.2.a. 
 40. Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 41. Id. 
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the statutory definition42 of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the federal taxa-
tion-of-costs statute.43 Under that statute, “costs” include 
clerk’s court costs, court reporter fees, witness fees, and other 
incidental costs of trial.44 Attorneys’ fees, on the other hand, 
are not considered costs within the meaning of § 1920.45 Even 
so, some statutes expand the § 1920 definition of costs to in-
clude attorneys’ fees.46 In those cases in which costs are broadly 
defined, the practical effect is that “a plaintiff who refuses a 
Rule 68 offer may lose entitlement to some portion of attorneys’ 
fees if the plaintiff does not recover more in the litigation than 
the defendant offered in settlement via Rule 68.”47 
Because a plaintiff ’s decision to accept or to reject the offer 
depends on how a court will construe the non-negotiable Rule 
68 offer, any uncertainty about the court’s interpretation of the 
offer creates risk for the plaintiff.48 A risk-averse plaintiff will 
be particularly susceptible to the pressure of accepting a Rule 
68 offer, even if the offer is unclear, lest she otherwise risk los-
ing attorneys’ fees and paying the defendant’s costs later.49 
 
 42. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68.02[4], at 68-9 n.13 (citing 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000). 
 44. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 68.02[4], 68.08[2]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. § 68.02[4], at 68-9 n.10 (“[T]he costs which are subject to the 
cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68 are those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 
unless the substantive law applicable to the particular cause of action expands 
the general § 1920 definition.” (citing Parkes v. Hall, 906 F.2d 658, 660 (11th 
Cir. 1990))); infra Part II.C.2.a (discussing cases in which courts include at-
torneys’ fees as part of costs); infra note 169 (referencing sources that list fee-
shifting statutes defining attorneys’ fees as part of costs). 
 47. Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 48. See id. at 622; infra Part II.D.2 (observing that the plaintiff faces a 
difficult choice when deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of judgment 
because the plaintiff does not know whether the court will interpret the offer 
amount to include or exclude fees). 
 49. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68-08[2], at 68-55 (citing 
Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333 (1st Cir. 1986)). One criticism of 
Rule 68 is that it creates an incentive for plaintiffs to accept offers far below 
the value of their case. See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, 
Foreword: Of Offers Not (Frequently) Made and (Rarely) Accepted: The Mystery 
of Federal Rule 68, 57 MERCER L. REV. 723, 735 (2006) (“The principal concern 
[was] that the defendants . . . would routinely make early, low-ball offers of 
judgment; the plaintiffs, fearful of forfeiting what is often the largest part of 
their recovery (attorneys fees), would feel compelled to accept . . . .”); cf. Yoon 
& Baker, supra note 24, at 162 (“[Rule 68] redistributes wealth from the plain-
tiff to the defendant . . . . Rule 68, if invoked, imposes risk on the plaintiff 
without any corresponding risk borne by the defendant. The defendant can ex-
ploit this inequality in the settlement process, compelling a lower settle-
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II.  DIFFICULTIES IN INTERPRETING OFFERS: 
UNCERTAINTIES IN RULE 68 OFFERS  
UNDERMINE THE RULE’S PURPOSE   
Despite Rule 68’s promise of promoting settlements and 
ending unnecessary litigation,50 the rule has done little to ad-
vance either goal. Instead, the rule’s ambiguity has served to 
discourage its use as a settlement vehicle. Under the current 
rule, plaintiffs are not the only ones who have to “think hard” 
about a Rule 68 offer—defendants, too, must “think hard” 
about whether and how to make such an offer in the first 
place.51 Uncertain how courts will interpret their offers and not 
wanting to be in a worse position after making an offer, many 
defendants make the prudent choice to avoid the rule alto-
gether.52 Of equal concern is what happens when a defendant 
does make an offer. Defendants, uncertain as to the parameters 
of Rule 68,53 draft arguably ambiguous offers that ultimately 
subject the defendants to unintended consequences, while at 
the same time leaving plaintiffs unable to value such offers ac-
curately.54 The combined result of litigants’ uncertainty is that 
the rule—whether avoided or used—does little to achieve its 
purpose of furthering financial and judicial economy.55 
 
ment.”). 
 50. See Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1077 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“Rule 68 is designed to encourage parties to evaluate objectively the strength 
of their cases; financial and judicial economy are at its core.”); WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 3, § 3001, at 66. 
 51. Some defendants are likely not aware of Rule 68 and its potential as a 
settlement device. Such unfamiliarity results from several factors. First, the 
text of the rule “affords no guidance on how to apply [its cost-shifting mecha-
nism].” Lewis & Eaton, supra note 49, at 733. Second, most attorneys were not 
exposed to Rule 68 in law school. Cf. David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr., Empirical Evidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Set-
tlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 536 (1995) (suggesting that lawyers re-
cently out of law school may be more receptive to using Rule 68 as a settle-
ment device). Third, and related to the uncertainties explored in this Article, 
the rule has not established itself as a part of the defense bar’s standard tool 
chest. See, e.g., Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
Rev. 1, 8 (1985) (“Defendants seldom make Rule 68 offers.”).  
 52. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 32, at 91 (“Many defendants are reluctant 
to make an offer of judgment . . . .”). 
 53. See Lewis & Eaton, supra note 49, at 733 (noting that the text of the 
rule does not make its application clear); supra note 51 (providing reasons why 
defense attorneys may be unfamiliar with Rule 68). 
 54. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the complexities arising from 
arguably ambiguous offers. 
 55. Even aside from the rule’s uncertainty, most commentators agree that 
the rule itself is far from perfect. See, e.g., Yoon & Baker, supra note 24, at 192 
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A. THE NATURE OF THE UNCERTAINTY IN DRAFTING AND 
EVALUATING RULE 68 OFFERS 
In theory, “[Rule 68] prompts both parties to a suit to 
evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them 
against the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits.”56 
However, under Rule 68, evaluating the value of a case has 
come to include much more than a party simply determining 
whether and how much it is likely to win or lose at trial—an 
evaluation every party engaged in settlement discussions must 
make.57 Instead, parties making or contemplating acceptance of 
a Rule 68 offer must consider how the court is likely to inter-
pret the terms of such offer; the wording of the offer becomes 
all-important.58 Even seemingly straightforward Rule 68 offers 
become a riddle for the unsuspecting practitioner.59 
 
(concluding that “an offer of judgment rule must have a credible cost-shifting 
mechanism in order to influence pre-trial negotiations” and commenting that 
Rule 68 has been ineffective in affecting such negotiations). Whether because 
of the rule’s one-sided nature or its lack of incentives (especially in non-fee-
shifting cases), many think the rule needs reconsideration. See, e.g., Lewis & 
Eaton, supra note 49, at 735 (noting the increased settlement leverage defen-
dants have when making Rule 68 offers); see also Peter Margulies, After 
Marek, the Deluge: Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 of Statutes 
That Do and Do Not Classify Attorneys’ Fees as “Costs,” 73 IOWA L. REV. 413, 
441–45 (1988) (proposing a percentage-based regime that would lessen the un-
certainty plaintiffs face in determining the value of their case against a defen-
dant’s offer of judgment by reducing the stakes for a plaintiff who values her 
case too high). Proposals related to these not uncommon criticisms are gener-
ally consistent with the proposal set forth in this Article. See infra note 291. 
Even so, this Article focuses on clarifying the existing rule with regard to of-
fers in order to eliminate barriers to the rule’s use and to reduce collateral liti-
gation when parties use the rule. There is little point in fixing Rule 68’s incen-
tives to be fairer or weightier if the rule’s ambiguity prevents parties from 
using it in the first place. 
 56. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). 
 57. Of course, evaluating a case’s potential value entails its own uncer-
tainty. For a criticism of the rule’s harsh effect on plaintiffs evaluating the 
value of their case relative to an offer, see Margulies, supra note 55, at 445 
(contending uncertainty about a case’s value causes plaintiffs to “guess low—
maybe too low—because it mandates the forfeiture of attorney’s fees when the 
plaintiff guesses too high”). Perhaps because it was written shortly after 
Marek, and thus without the benefit of two decades of post-Marek litigation, 
Margulies’ article dismisses the uncertainty highlighted in this Article: the 
uncertainty faced by litigants who, even assuming they could accurately value 
the case, cannot accurately predict how a court will interpret the Rule 68 offer. 
See id. at 429–30 (“Little decisional uncertainty exists in this situation be-
cause Marek requires that a court consider the issue ex post. Once the judg-
ment is known, a decision is easy if no problems arise with setting pre-offer 
fees or assessing the status of injunctive relief.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 58. See Jay H. Krulewitch, Note, Anatomy of a Double Whammy: The Ap-
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Much of the uncertainty in Rule 68 litigation pertains to 
recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees. In Marek v. Chesny, the 
Supreme Court held that all Rule 68 offers must include 
costs.60 Defendants may include costs by offering a lump-sum 
settlement inclusive of costs or by offering a settlement exclu-
sive of costs to which costs willlater be added if accepted. 
Attorneys’ fees complicate the question because they are not 
considered part of “costs,” and therefore they are not included 
in the lump-sum settlement, unless the statute under which 
the lawsuit is brought so defines them.61 For example, attor-
neys’ fees are defined as part of costs in § 1983 actions62 but are 
defined separately from costs in Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) claims.63 To add to the complication, even 
for claims brought under statutes such as the ADEA in which 
attorneys’ fees are not defined as costs, courts may still add at-
torneys’ fees to an offer that does not clearly exclude them.64 
The result is that Rule 68’s application varies greatly depend-
ing on how the statute underlying a plaintiff ’s claim defines at-
torneys’ fees and how the particular offer is drafted.65 
 
plication of Rule 68 Offers and Fee Waivers of Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Un-
der Section 1988, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 103, 115 (1988) (“Application of Marek by 
the lower courts to Rule 68 settlement offers has focused on the specific terms 
of the offer and its validity.”). 
 59. See Simon, supra note 51, at 6 n.18 (“Surprisingly, courts are still de-
bating whether the phrase ‘must pay the costs incurred’ in [R]ule 68 requires 
the offeree merely to bear his own post-offer costs or actually to pay the of-
feror’s post-offer costs.”); Symposium, Revitalizing FRCP 68: Can Offers of 
Judgment Provide Adequate Incentives for Fair, Early Settlement of Fee-
Recovery Cases?: Session Three, “Changes to Rule 68,” 57 MERCER L. REV. 791, 
801 (2006) (“It is a complex rule as it is . . . .”) (statement of Mr. Barry Rose-
man). 
 60. See 473 U.S. at 6, 9. 
 61. MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68.02[4], at 68-9 to -10. The issue of 
whether costs are inclusive of attorneys’ fees usually arises in the context of 
fee-shifting statutes. Even so, Marek suggests that attorneys’ fees are also 
properly treated as part of costs in cases in which a contract defines costs as 
inclusive of attorneys’ fees. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 9; Util. Automation 2000, 
Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2002) (indi-
cating that under Marek, costs may include attorneys’ fees if a contract be-
tween the parties so defines them). 
 62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) (defining fees-as-costs in § 1983 actions). 
 63. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (2000) (defining fees and costs sepa-
rately). 
 64. See, e.g., Marek, 473 U.S. at 6. 
 65. In criticizing the majority’s holding in Marek, Justice Brennan pointed 
out that the holding would result in “dramatically different settlement incen-
tives depending on minor variations in the phraseology of the underlying fees-
award statutes . . . .” 473 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
2007] REWRITING RULE 68 879 
 
Consider the following hypothetical: A plaintiff receives a 
Rule 68 offer of judgment for $175,000 and must weigh that of-
fer against her assessment of the value of her case at that time. 
If she thinks she is likely to recover $150,000 at trial, it would 
appear at first blush that she should accept the offer. But what 
if the offer also arguably is inclusive of costs? Imagine the offer 
is for “$175,000 including costs.” If her costs at that point are 
only $10,000 then it would still appear she should accept the 
offer. But what if it is a civil rights case under which the rele-
vant statute defines attorneys’ fees as part of “costs?” If her at-
torneys’ fees at that point are $40,000, then the offer no longer 
appears to be a good settlement for her. She is now comparing 
the offer of $175,000 to her expected recovery (at that point) of 
$200,000. Even so, the offer would be a good settlement for her 
if her claims were brought under a statute that allowed recov-
ery of attorneys’ fees, although not defining such fees as “costs.” 
In that situation, she would expect that if she accepted the of-
fer, she would be able to seek recovery of her attorneys’ fees in 
addition to the $175,000. 
Her uncertainty in evaluating the offer would be magnified 
if the offer stated that it was for “$175,000 with costs.” Does the 
term “with costs” mean that if she accepts the offer, costs will 
be awarded in addition to the $175,000, or does it mean costs 
are included within the $175,000? What if the offer was for 
“$175,000 in full satisfaction of all claims?” What if the offer 
stated “$175,000 including costs (but not attorneys’ fees)?” And 
last, what if it purported to be a “lump sum offer for $175,000” 
yet did not explicitly refer to costs and attorneys’ fees? 
These hypothetical questions have no clear or easy an-
swers. The text of Rule 68 provides little guidance on how to 
draft a Rule 68 offer and little notice to plaintiffs about how a 
court will interpret an offer.66 In addition, the case law apply-
ing the rule to specific offers does not establish a consistent test 
for litigants to use in drafting and evaluating Rule 68 offers.67 
Thus, even if litigants had unlimited resources to research and 
 
added). Indeed, as this Article proposes, not only the incentives (consequences) 
differ; as an initial matter the terms of Rule 68 offers themselves differ de-
pending upon the underlying fee-award statute, thus creating substantial un-
certainty about the meaning of the offer. 
 66. See Fisher, supra note 32, at 117 (“Despite the fact that the rule has 
been in existence for sixty-three years, confusion often develops in application 
of this rule to specific cases.”). 
 67. See infra Part II.C (discussing the divergent interpretations of Rule 68 
offers). 
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evaluate Rule 68 before making or accepting an offer—a dubi-
ous assumption, especially for a rule intended to promote fi-
nancial economy68—considerable uncertainty would still ac-
company the current rule. 
What are the particular uncertainties and risks litigants 
face under Rule 68? The only purposeful risk is the risk that 
the rule was intended to create—the risk to the plaintiff of not 
being able to recover post-offer costs (and attorneys’ fees if the 
claim is brought under a fee-shifting statute that defines fees 
as “costs”) if the judgment obtained at trial is less than the of-
fer.69 The other risks—and risks that do not advance the rule’s 
purpose—are those which stem from the uncertainties sur-
rounding the application of the rule to determine the validity 
and meaning of particular offers. 
The cases discussed below highlight the uncertainty that 
currently surrounds the interpretation of Rule 68 offers.70 
Much of this uncertainty stems from the lack of clarity in the 
rule itself. For the litigant who is unfamiliar with the rule, the 
rule’s text provides neither notice nor guidance as to how courts 
will construe Rule 68 offers.71 And even for the reasonably in-
formed litigator, the rule’s cursory form leaves considerable un-
certainty. 
B. CANVASS OF CASES IN WHICH CONFUSION EXISTS 
REGARDING VALIDITY OF OFFER 
Uncertainty arises in Rule 68 cases with regard to whether 
particular offers are valid. Courts are called upon to decide the 
validity of offers that disclaim liability (or at least do not admit 
it),72 the validity of offers for which revocation is attempted,73 
and the validity of offers that do not provide for both injunctive 
and monetary relief when both types of relief are requested.74 
Neither the text of the rule nor the case law clearly resolves 
 
 68. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 5 (“The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encour-
age settlement and avoid litigation.”). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See infra Parts II.B−C. 
 71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 72. E.g., Mite v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 106 F.R.D. 434, 435 (N.D. Ill. 
1985). 
 73. E.g., Richardson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 760, 764 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995). 
 74. E.g., Leach v. N. Telecom, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 420, 428 (E.D.N.C. 1991). 
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these issues of validity.75 This section explores the uncertainty 
regarding particular offers’ validity, and examines the implica-
tions to litigants resulting from this lack of certainty. 
1. Whether Offers May Disclaim Liability 
One type of uncertainty that arises is whether offers that 
disclaim liability are invalid. A Rule 68 offer of judgment, 
unlike a typical settlement offer, is filed with the court upon 
acceptance, after which a formal judgment is entered against 
the defendant.76 Some defendants, concerned about the nega-
tive publicity that may arise from an adverse judgment being 
entered against them, choose to include a statement in their of-
fer that disclaims liability and/or wrongdoing. Still other de-
fendants say nothing one or way or the other about admitting 
or denying liability in their offers. It is unclear from the rule or 
the attendant case law whether such a disclaimer, or the ab-
sence of an express admission of liability, invalidates a Rule 68 
offer. 
Most courts to examine the issue have held that an offer is 
not rendered invalid because it disclaims liability or fails to 
admit liability. For example, in Jolly v. Coughlin, the plaintiff 
argued that the Rule 68 offer was invalid because the offer 
specified that it was “not to be construed either as an admission 
that defendants are liable in this action, or that plaintiff has 
 
 75. In addition, certain questions of offers’ validity arise in multi-party 
litigation. Most of these questions, however, arise at the post-offer stage. For 
example, in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs, a defendant may make a 
Rule 68 offer to each for a particular amount, yet condition the offer on accep-
tance by all plaintiffs. One commentator describes the ensuing complications: 
Suppose all but one [plaintiff ] accept, the offer expires, and the judg-
ment is less favorable to all? Can those who sought to accept be held 
to pay post-offer fees to the defendant? Should all of the burden be 
imposed on the one who held out? If only those who reject are subject 
to Rule 68 consequences, what happens if those who reject do better 
by the judgment and those who would have accepted do worse, as 
should happen whenever each made an accurate prediction of the 
judgment? 
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 68, Fee Shifting, and the Rulemaking Process, in RE-
FORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108, 127 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996). Not 
surprisingly, courts have reached different conclusions in addressing these 
complications. Compare Tocwish v. Jablon, 183 F.R.D. 239, 242 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(holding an offer conditioned on acceptance by all plaintiffs invalid for cost-
shifting purposes), with Lang v. Gates, 36 F.3d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1994) (uphold-
ing an offer conditioned on acceptance by all parties and applying cost-shifting 
provisions to deny post-offer attorneys’ fees). 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
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suffered any damage.”77 While the court agreed that the state-
ment constituted an “express denial of liability,”78 it found no 
problem with such a disclaimer.79 The court reasoned that 
nothing in the rule or the decisions interpreting the rule im-
posed a requirement that an offer admit liability, and that, by 
extension, nothing in the rule disallowed expressly disclaiming 
liability.80 Indeed, as the court observed, to hold otherwise 
would discourage use of the rule and thereby reduce the rule’s 
effectiveness as a settlement tool.81 Similarly, courts have re-
jected the argument that a Rule 68 offer must expressly admit 
liability, with one court dismissing such an argument as “ut-
terly without merit.”82 
Despite the near uniformity among courts addressing this 
issue, parties still continue to engage in collateral litigation re-
garding the significance of an offer’s language (or lack of lan-
guage) regarding liability. Recently, in Barrow v. Greenville In-
dependent School District, the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant’s Rule 68 offer was invalid because it did not admit 
liability.83 While the district court rejected that argument,84 
another court, in City of Boca Raton v. Faragher, appears to 
have accepted it, holding that an offer that does not expressly 
admit liability does not comply with Rule 68.85 
Although the district court in Faragher was reversed on 
appeal on other grounds,86 the case demonstrates the existence 
 
 77. No. 92 Civ. 9026(JGK), 1999 WL 20895, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1999). 
 78. Id. at *9. 
 79. See id. at *8. 
 80. See id.; see also Mite v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 106 F.R.D. 434, 435 
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding valid an offer that expressly disclaimed liability); 
Coleman v. McLaren, 92 F.R.D. 754, 757 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff ’d sub nom. 
Pigeaud v. McLaren, 699 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding offer that expressly 
disclaimed liability valid although ultimately finding offer less favorable than 
the relief obtained at trial because of the disclaimer). 
 81. See Jolly, 1999 WL 20895, at *8. 
 82. Staples v. Wickesberg, 122 F.R.D. 541, 544 (E.D. Wis. 1988); see also 
Jolly, 1999 WL 20895, at *8 (discussing case law holding that “Rule 68 does 
not require that offers of judgment include[] admissions of liability”). 
 83. See No. 3:00-CV-0913-D, 2005 WL 1867292, at *19 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 
2005). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See Brief of Appellant City of Boca Raton at *18, City of Boca Raton v. 
Faragher, No. 95-4495, 1995 WL 17063486 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 1995) (“[T]he 
District Court found that because the city did not admit liability, the offer did 
not comply with the requirements of Rule 68.”). 
 86. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 
1997), rev’d, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Su-
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of continuing uncertainty and resulting collateral litigation.87 
Without clarification about the necessity and/or propriety of a 
liability clause, both plaintiffs and defendants face uncertainty 
at the offer stage. For example, a plaintiff who would like to re-
ject an offer that contains a liability disclaimer because to her 
it detracts from the value of the offer must decide whether the 
court will nevertheless uphold the offer as valid. And a defen-
dant who would like to make an offer containing a liability dis-
claimer also faces uncertainty in deciding whether the inclu-
sion of such a disclaimer will render the offer invalid for Rule 
68 purposes. Under such circumstances, a defendant may elect 
not to make a Rule 68 offer or to make such an offer, only to 
have a court later hold the offer was invalid. Either scenario 
detracts from the rule’s effectiveness as a tool of settlement. 
2. Whether Offers May Be Revoked 
Confusion also arises as to whether Rule 68 offers are revo-
cable. The rule itself provides that the offeree has ten days in 
which to accept the offer, after which time the offer is “deemed 
withdrawn.”88 Still, uncertainty arises because “the rule is si-
lent on whether the defending party may withdraw the offer be-
 
preme Court addressed the Rule 68 issue. 
 87. While the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, litigants should be 
cautious in this area because liability disclaimers—even if deemed valid—may 
affect the court’s analysis at the post-offer stage. First, some courts consider 
the existence of a liability disclaimer in determining whether an unaccepted 
offer is “more favorable” than the judgment finally obtained. See Fisher, supra 
note 32, at 101−02 (discussing Coleman and other cases in which an offer was 
deemed less favorable than a judgment because a liability disclaimer detracted 
from the value of the offer). A better rule would seem to be one in which a li-
ability disclaimer does not weigh into the determination of whether the offer is 
more or less favorable than the judgment obtained. See Jolly v. Coughlin, No. 
92 Civ. 9026(JGK), 1999 WL 20895, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1999) (“[I]f an 
admission of liability were a factor considered in the Rule 68 comparison be-
tween the offer of judgment and the ultimate judgment obtained, an admission 
of liability by the defendant would become a de facto requirement of every of-
fer of judgment since every judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff after a 
trial would necessarily contain a finding of liability.”). 
Second, some courts find that the existence of a liability disclaimer de-
tracts from plaintiffs’ alleged status as prevailing parties. See Aynes v. Space 
Guard Prods., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 445, 450−51 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (discussing case 
law in this area). Notably, this Article’s proposed revisions to Rule 68 would 
eliminate both types of uncertainty that arise at the offer and post-offer stages 
by amending the rule so that offers are not admissions of liability; thus, the 
need for offers to state such a disclaimer would be eliminated. See infra Parts 
III.B, III.C.2. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
884 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:865 
 
fore the ten-day period has elapsed and while the claimant is 
still considering it.”89 Courts addressing the issue of a Rule 68 
offer’s revocability have reached different conclusions. Because 
of this uncertainty, litigants are unsure whether a given offer 
will be deemed valid under Rule 68. 
Some courts have taken a bright-line approach and have 
held that Rule 68 offers are categorically not revocable.90 In 
Richardson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., the defen-
dant attempted to revoke his Rule 68 offer upon learning new 
information in discovery about the extent of the plaintiff ’s 
damages.91 The court on appeal held that “a Rule 68 offer is 
simply not revocable during the 10-day period.”92 To hold oth-
erwise would be counter to the rule’s “finely tuned procedure.”93 
The rule puts “significant pressure on the plaintiff to think 
hard about the likely value of its claim,” and in return gives the 
plaintiff “10 days to ponder the matter.”94 If Rule 68 offers were 
revocable, “the pressure on the plaintiff would be greater than 
the [r]ule contemplates, because the [r]ule so construed would 
allow a defendant to engage in tactical pressuring maneu-
vers.”95 Other circuits have adopted a bright-line test, similar 
to that of Richardson, and have deemed Rule 68 offers per se 
irrevocable.96 
In contrast, other courts have left the door open to allow 
defendants the opportunity to revoke their Rule 68 offers. In 
Cesar v. Rubie’s Costume Co., the court allowed the revocation 
of a Rule 68 offer within the ten-day period.97 In doing so, the 
court adopted a four-prong test that considers the equities to 
the parties in allowing the revocation.98 Applying that fact-
 
 89. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3004, at 102–05. 
 90. See Richardson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995). 
 91. Specifically, the defendant’s offer provided $150,000 to compensate 
plaintiff for his shoulder injuries alleged to have resulted from defendant’s 
negligence. See id. at 762. 
 92. Id. at 765. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (citing Morris K. Udall, May Offers of Judgment Under Rule 68 Be 
Revoked Before Acceptance?, 19 F.R.D. 401, 405 (1957)). 
 96. See Cesar v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 219 F.R.D. 257, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“In a variety of contexts, the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have all 
stated that Rule 68 offers are irrevocable during the ten-day period.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 97. See id. at 261. 
 98. See id. 
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specific test, the court concluded that the defendant had clearly 
demonstrated that the offer contained a “clerical error” which a 
“reasonable attorney could have easily made.”99 Given the con-
densed timing of the offer, revocation, and acceptance, the court 
held that “there can not be any doubt that the plaintiff can be 
restored to its ex ante position.”100 Although the court recog-
nized that “[t]here is undoubtedly a valid concern that defen-
dants could strategically use Rule 68 offers to engage in tactical 
pressuring maneuvers if Rule 68 offers were generally revoca-
ble,” it downplayed this concern in situations in which there ex-
ists an “obvious mistake” in the text of the offer.101 
While Rubie’s Costume Co. did not involve an evidentiary 
hearing, other revocation cases have resulted in extensive costs 
and delays, stemming in large part from such hearings. Indeed, 
the trial court proceedings in Richardson v. National Railroad 
Corp. demonstrate the type of legal maneuvers related to revo-
cation and the attendant costs and delays.102 There, the defen-
dant’s motion relating to revocation of his offer set in place a 
series of costly legal proceedings. Specifically, the evidentiary 
hearings were held over a nine-month period, during which 
time sixteen different experts testified in support of the defen-
dant’s revocation claim.103 Following the hearings, the district 
court somewhat reluctantly denied the defendant’s motion, and 
the Rule 68 offer was formally entered as judgment.104 As noted 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 260. 
 102. 49 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 103. Id. at 763. Undoubtedly, the revocation issue was complicated because 
it dealt with the defendant’s efforts to show fraud on the part of the plaintiff, 
which the defendant argued justified its revocation. Id. at 762. The specifics of 
the defendant’s assertion were as follows: The defendant claimed that it dis-
covered new information which cast doubt on the extent of the plaintiff ’s inju-
ries. Id. at 762−63. Because the defendant discovered this information after it 
had made its Rule 68 offer, the defendant purported to withdraw its offer via a 
fax to the plaintiff. Id. at 762. But the plaintiff, still within the ten-day period 
for accepting the offer, ignored the purported withdrawal and filed its accep-
tance of the offer with the court the following day. Id. The defendant then filed 
a “Motion to Set Aside Plaintiff ’s Purported Acceptance,” prompting the clerk 
to defer entering judgment. Id. The lengthy revocation proceedings were thus 
set into motion. 
 104. Id. at 763 (pointing to the district court’s statement in its ruling that 
it was denying the motions “although not without ‘a degree of reluctance’” (ci-
tations omitted)). 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
886 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:865 
 
above, an appeal followed, with the result that the plaintiff ex-
pended years and significant fees on the issue of revocation.105 
The rule’s lack of clarity about revocation, and the diver-
gent case law, leaves litigants with considerable uncertainty as 
to whether and under what circumstances a court will allow a 
Rule 68 offer to be revoked.106 Moreover, in jurisdictions in 
which the rule has been construed to allow such revocation, the 
uncertainty is magnified, negatively affecting both litigants as 
well as the courts. Litigants must make decisions in the face of 
such uncertainty. Defendants may choose to avoid the rule be-
cause its parameters are unclear. And plaintiffs, as the court 
opined in Richardson, may be forced to accept a Rule 68 offer 
prematurely, lest an intervening event occur such that the 
court allows the defendant to revoke the as-of-yet unaccepted 
offer. Courts, lacking a clear test from the rule itself, are left to 
sift through the arguments. These ambiguities undermine the 
purported self-executing nature of the rule.107 
3. Whether Offers Must Provide for Relief Requested in the 
Complaint 
Injunctive relief also creates confusion in interpreting Rule 
68 offers. While it is well-established that a Rule 68 offer must 
dispose of the case as a whole,108 some confusion still exists re-
garding whether an offer made in a case in which both mone-
tary and injunctive relief is sought must offer both types of re-
lief. Specifically, litigants are uncertain whether an offer that 
only provides for injunctive relief when money damages also 
are sought is valid and, conversely, whether an offer that only 
provides for damages when injunctive relief also is sought is 
valid.109 
 
 105. See id. at 760−63. 
 106. Notably, the circuits are split on the issue, and some circuits have yet 
to weigh in. 
 107. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 68’s intent 
that judgments entered pursuant to Rule 68 be self-executing). 
 108. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3002, at 90. 
 109. In addition to confusion about an offer’s validity, offers that involve 
injunctive relief also raise significant valuation questions. Such questions 
arise with regard to rejected offers, which require courts to compare the value 
of the nonmonetary relief offered to the judgment obtained. While no rewriting 
of Rule 68 can avoid what is an inherently difficult comparison, courts should 
nonetheless be mindful that as the drafter of the offer, the defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating the offer’s value and showing that it is more favor-
able than the judgment obtained. See id. § 3006.1, at 127−28 (stating that the 
comparison of the offer to the judgment obtained is “intrinsically more difficult 
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The rule itself does not speak directly to this issue.110 Even 
so, most courts have held that the rule does not require that an 
offer specifically provide for all types of relief sought.111 In 
Leach v. Northern Telecom, Inc., the court rejected the  
plaintiff ’s motion to strike the offer of judgment.112 The plain-
tiff contended that the offer was invalid because it did not in-
clude the equitable relief it sought in its complaint.113 The court 
upheld the offer’s validity and stated: “Nothing in Rule 68 re-
quires equitable relief to be included as part [of] an offer of 
judgment when the complaint seeks both equitable and mone-
tary relief.”114 
Yet some courts—even within the same jurisdiction—have 
held otherwise. For example, in Whitcher v. Town of Matthews, 
the defendant offered monetary damages only, even though the 
plaintiff also had sought injunctive relief.115 In its acceptance of 
the offer, the plaintiff stated that the defendant had “made no 
Offer of Judgment concerning Plaintiff[s’] request for injunctive 
relief and for a declaratory judgment” and that “[t]hese por-
tions of the complaint remain[ed] pending.”116 The court dis-
agreed, holding that the offer was all-inclusive.117 In explaining 
its holding, the court stated that offers that did not include 
 
where one or both involves nonmonetary relief ” and that “no clear rules can 
guide” the comparison). See generally Thomas L. Cubbage, Note, Federal Rule 
68 Offers of Judgment and Equitable Relief: Where Angels Fear to Tread, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 465 (1991) (surveying court decisions involving the application of 
Rule 68 to equitable relief and discussing their methods for comparing the 
Rule 68 offer to the judgment obtained). 
For a recent decision in which equitable relief was valued, such that the 
court decided the Rule 68 offer was less favorable than the judgment obtained, 
see Reiter v. MTA New York City Transit Authority, 457 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 
2006), in which the Second Circuit valued the plaintiff ’s equitable relief of job 
reinstatement at more than $10,000, such that Rule 68 was not triggered. 
 110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 111. MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68.04[5], at 68-28. 
 112. 141 F.R.D. 420, 429 (E.D.N.C. 1991). 
 113. See id. at 428. 
 114. Id. Similarly, in Barrow v. Greenville Independent School District, the 
court rejected the argument that the Rule 68 offer was invalid because it did 
not provide for the requested equitable relief. See No. 3:00-CV-0913-D, 2005 
WL 1867292, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005). The court reasoned that the rule 
allows a party making an offer to decide what to offer, and that parties are 
“not obligated to offer each type of [requested] relief in [their] Rule 68 offers.” 
Id. at *20. 
 115. 136 F.R.D. 582, 582 (W.D.N.C. 1991). 
 116. Id. at 584. 
 117. See id. at 585. 
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both monetary and injunctive relief, when both such forms of 
relief were requested in the complaint, would be invalid: 
An offer that does not include money damages prayed, but only con-
sents to the plaintiff having the equitable relief demanded, is not con-
sistent with the requirement of the Rule that offers be unconditional. 
In the same light, offers including only monetary damages but exclud-
ing equitable or injunctive relief would also be inconsistent with the 
[r]ule.118 
The rule’s ambiguity as to how courts should construe of-
fers when plaintiffs seek injunctive relief affects both litigants 
and courts. Defendants are uncertain whether their offers will 
later be deemed invalid because they do not expressly provide 
for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs, too, do not know how a court will 
rule on offers’ validity under such circumstances, and thus 
must make a decision to accept or reject an offer in the face of 
such uncertainty. Courts, like those in Leach and Whitcher, 
must resolve collateral litigation about whether offers are valid 
when they do not provide for injunctive relief sought (or, alter-
nately, only provide for injunctive relief sought). And thus, this 
“self-executing” settlement rule becomes a catalyst for more 
litigation.119 
C. CANVASS OF CASES IN WHICH CONFUSION EXISTS 
REGARDING SCOPE OF OFFERS RELATED TO COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
By far the greatest confusion in interpreting Rule 68 offers 
relates to the question of the scope of particular offers. This 
section examines cases showing the various types of confusion 
inherent under the current rule: whether the amount of the of-
fer includes costs, and whether the amount of the offer includes 
attorneys’ fees. In reviewing the case law, this section explores 
the problems that result from the rule’s ambiguity. 
1. Whether the Amount of the Offer Includes Costs 
Rule 68 requires that all offers include “costs then ac-
crued.”120 The Supreme Court explained in Marek v. Chesny: 
 
 118. Id. (citation omitted). 
 119. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 68’s intent 
that judgments entered be self-executing). 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 68; see also Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choc-
tawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The sole con-
straint Rule 68 places on offers of judgment is its mandate that an offer in-
clude ‘costs then accrued.’”). 
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If an offer recites that costs are included or specifies an amount for 
costs, and the plaintiff accepts the offer, the judgment will necessarily 
include costs; if the offer does not state that costs are included and an 
amount for costs is not specified, the court will be obliged by the 
terms of [Rule 68] to include in its judgment an additional amount 
which in its discretion it determines to be sufficient to cover the 
costs.121 
The question that arises in particular cases is whether 
costs were in fact included within the terms of the offer, or 
whether the court must add them to the offer. The stakes as to 
whether costs were included are especially high in fee-shifting 
cases in which the statute underlying the plaintiff ’s claim au-
thorizes attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff 
as costs, such as civil rights and copyright cases.122 
a. Confusion When the Offer Mentions Costs 
Defendants’ choice of language regarding “costs” in draft-
ing Rule 68 offers often creates considerable confusion. Perhaps 
because the rule itself requires that an offer of judgment be 
made for a specified sum “with costs then accrued,”123 some de-
fendants draft their offers using the “with costs” language. In 
such circumstances, problems arise because of ambiguity sur-
rounding whether “with costs” means that the offer is inclusive 
of costs or, on the other hand, whether the offer is for a certain 
amount plus costs. The court in Kyreakakis v. Paternoster faced 
this issue when the defendant offered, and the plaintiff ac-
cepted, a Rule 68 offer “for $50,000.00 with costs now ac-
crued.”124 The defendant urged the court to construe the offer 
as a lump-sum offer inclusive of costs, and to deny the  
 
 121. 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985) (citation omitted). 
 122. Marek both established and examined this question in detail. In that 
case, Rule 68 clearly was triggered; the judgment total was $92,000 as com-
pared to the $100,000 offer. See id. at 3−4. Thus, the question under Marek 
concerned the consequences of Rule 68 being triggered, and the shifting of par-
ticular post-offer costs. See id. at 5. The court held that post-offer costs under 
Rule 68 include attorneys’ fees when the underlying statute at issue in the 
litigation defined such fees as “costs.” See id. at 8−9. Since Marek, litigants 
have, as Justice Brennan predicted in his dissent, disputed when attorneys’ 
fees are part of the post-offer costs that shift. See id. at 24−30 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the potential inconsistencies between the statutory au-
thorization of attorneys’ fees and Rule 68). While the various consequences 
that attach to a plaintiff when Rule 68 is triggered are beyond the scope of this 
Article, the same need for certainty that occurs at the offer stage also occurs at 
the enforcement stage. See infra note 320. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 124. 732 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (D.N.J. 1990). 
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plaintiff ’s motion seeking costs.125 The court held, however, 
that the language was ambiguous126 and thus looked to the “to-
tality of the circumstances” surrounding the offer to determine 
its meaning.127 The court concluded that under the particular 
circumstances the offer’s language “with costs” did not mean 
that costs were included.128 
Yet in another case with almost identical facts, the court 
refused to enforce a Rule 68 offer that used the “with costs” 
language. In Christian v. R. Wood Motors, Inc., the court held 
that an offer for “Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred and 
no/100 Dollars ($37,500.00) with costs” was ambiguous, as it 
could be construed as plus costs or could be construed as inclu-
sive of costs.129 Although urged to consider extrinsic evidence to 
determine the offer’s meaning, the court refused to do so.130 
Under principles of contract interpretation, the court stated, it 
must look only to the offer itself—and not to extrinsic evidence 
of the parties’ intent and understanding—to determine whether 
the offer is ambiguous.131 To do otherwise, would risk “collat-
eral proceedings [that] would undermine entirely the purpose 
of the rule.”132 Thus, the court held that the offer lacked a 
“definite and precise” meaning, such that no meeting of the 
minds existed between the litigants.133 It therefore refused to 
enforce the offer in a post-trial proceeding in which the defen-
dant sought to cut off the plaintiff ’s award of costs.134 In con-
cluding, the court noted that its ruling “in no way should . . . be 
 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at 1292. 
 127. Id. at 1294. 
 128. Id. Other courts have similarly interpreted “with costs” language. See, 
e.g., Laskowski v. Buhay, 192 F.R.D. 480, 480 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (construing an 
offer of “$25,000, with costs accrued” as meaning $25,000 plus costs). 
 129. No. 91-CV-1348, 1995 WL 238981, at *1, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. It is well-established that such principles of contract interpretation 
should govern the interpretation of Rule 68 offers. See, e.g., MOORE ET AL., su-
pra note 12, § 68.04[6]. However, as explored in the holdings discussed above 
in Parts II.B−C, this unifying principle still does not offer sufficient certainty 
for litigants. Indeed, as one court explains, a “Rule 68 offer of judgment . . . 
has characteristics that distinguish it from a normal contract.” Said v. Va. 
Commonwealth Univ., 130 F.R.D. 60, 63 (E.D. Va. 1990) (refusing to consider 
extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of an ambiguous offer). 
 132. Christian, 1995 WL 238981, at *9 (quoting Sas v. Trintex, 709 F. 
Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 133. Id. at *10 (citation omitted). 
 134. See id. at *11. 
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construed as a finding that all Rule 68 offers which track the 
language of that [r]ule are necessarily ambiguous” and that in-
stead its ruling was “limited to the unique facts of this case.”135 
Even leaving aside concerns about fairness to defendants 
who seemingly track the language of Rule 68 yet end up un-
pleasantly surprised, rulings such as Kyreakakis create a fac-
tually intensive, less than bright-line rule that casts uncer-
tainty on future litigants trying to evaluate how a court might 
construe “with costs” language.136 Moreover, the different ap-
proaches taken by courts in construing “with costs” language—
language which appears to be driven at least in part by policy 
considerations137—leave litigants without guidance as to which 
approach a court might take. Indeed, the Christian court ex-
pressly leaves open the possibility of the same court reaching 
the opposite conclusion were it instead faced with a plaintiff 
who had accepted an offer and then sought to recover costs as 
part of that offer.138 
b. Confusion When the Offer Does Not Mention Costs 
The uncertainty regarding whether an offer is lump-sum is 
exacerbated when the language of the offer is silent as to costs. 
For example, in Rohrer v. Slatile Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 
the defendant was surprised to learn that what it intended to 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. This case-by-case determination of intent when faced with arguably 
ambiguous contract language runs counter to the holdings of other courts that 
ambiguity in Rule 68 contracts should be resolved against the drafter. See, 
e.g., Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D. Conn. 1996) (rejecting case-by-
case determinations of intent and holding that ambiguous language should be 
construed against the drafter because plaintiffs “should not be left to guess 
how courts will interpret extrinsic evidence of what is, and is not, included in 
the offer” (citation omitted)). While the outcome under either test is the same 
in these particular cases, the case-by-case determination of intent approach 
leaves the door open to uncertainty for future litigants. 
 137. See Christian, 1995 WL 238981, at *11 (noting the “undeniably harsh 
result” that would accompany a denial of attorneys’ fees). 
 138. See id. Although some courts have allowed plaintiffs to seek clarifica-
tion of the terms of an offer before the ten-day acceptance period expires. See, 
e.g., Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1988). Other courts 
have not allowed clarification. See, e.g., Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choc-
tawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Unlike tradi-
tional settlement negotiations, in which a plaintiff may seek clarification or 
make a counteroffer, a plaintiff faced with a Rule 68 offer may only accept or 
refuse.”). Moreover, such post-offer/pre-acceptance communications have the 
potential to breed their own collateral litigation. Cf. Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 
F.3d 259, 276 n.16 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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be an all-inclusive offer actually subjected it to a judgment for 
the amount of the accepted offer as well as costs, which in-
cluded attorneys’ fees.139 The offer stated that it was “to allow 
Judgment to be taken against [Defendant] in this action for the 
aggregate sum of $3200, i.e. $800 for each of the Plaintiffs.”140 
Upon the plaintiffs’ motion for costs, the court held that 
“[u]nless a defendant’s offer expressly provides that the amount 
includes all costs, the court should determine costs under Rule 
68.”141 The court rejected the defendant’s argument—similar to 
the holding in Christian—that the offer was, at the very least, 
not enforceable because the defendant had intended for the of-
fer to be inclusive of all costs and fees and thus there was no 
“meeting of minds.”142 
Instead, the court in Rohrer focused on “not whether the 
parties’ minds have met on each component of the judgment, 
but rather whether the defendant offered to have judgment en-
tered against it and whether the plaintiffs have accepted the 
offer of entry of judgment.”143 The court’s ruling was especially 
damaging to the defendant because the case was brought under 
Title VII, under which attorneys’ fees are defined as “costs”; as 
such, the court required the defendant to pay costs, including 
attorneys’ fees, in addition to the $3200 offered pursuant to 
Rule 68.144 While the court left the amount of such costs and 
fees open for consideration upon further briefing, the defendant 
clearly ended up much worse off than it intended when it made 
the $3200 offer.145 
 
 139. 655 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 
 140. Id. at 737. 
 141. Id. at 738. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 738−39. 
 145. In a similar case, Webb v. James, the court also refused to alter the 
plain language of a Rule 68 offer in which the defendant failed to state that its 
offer was inclusive of costs. See 147 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 1998). To do so, the 
court reasoned, would undermine the rule’s purpose and be unfair to plaintiffs. 
See id. at 621−22. Thus, the court allowed recovery of costs in addition to the 
amount of the Rule 68 offer. See id. at 622. The court also allowed recovery of 
attorneys’ fees, in addition to the amount of the offer, even though such fees 
were not considered part of “costs.” See id. The sticker shock to the defendant 
in Webb was considerable: the defendant had to pay over $98,000 in costs and 
attorneys’ fees in addition to the $50,000 it offered under Rule 68. See id. at 
620, 623; see also infra Part II.C.2.b.i (discussing the court’s holding in Webb 
regarding attorneys’ fees, including the court’s application of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60 to the offer on grounds of “mistake”). 
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While the Rohrer court did not elaborate on the reasons for 
construing an offer’s silence against the defendant, the court in 
Said v. Virginia Commonwealth University146 did. There, in 
ruling that a Rule 68 offer that was silent as to costs was not 
inclusive of costs, the court emphasized the unique posture of 
Rule 68 offers. Because Rule 68 offerees are “bound by an offer 
of judgment whether it is accepted or not,” an offeree must “be 
able to discern with certainty what the precise terms of that of-
fer are.”147 As such, courts should be “reluctant” to consider ex-
trinsic evidence and instead should construe the offer against 
the defendant drafter.148 
The problems stemming from the uncertainty in how 
courts interpret a Rule 68 offer are exacerbated by the inconsis-
tencies in how courts interpret such offers. In a case almost 
identical to Rohrer, the court considered an offer that made no 
reference to costs yet reached a holding opposite to Rohrer.149 
Specifically, the court in Stewart refused to construe the offer, 
which made no mention of costs, against the defendant. The 
court started with the plain language of the offer, which pro-
vided that “judgment be entered on any or all counts against 
Defendant in a total amount not to exceed FOUR THOUSAND 
FIVE HUNDRED AND No/100 DOLLARS ($4,500.00) as pro-
vided in Rule 68.”150 The court framed the issue as “involv[ing] 
whether the parties intended that an offer of judgment under 
[Rule] 68 was to include attorney’ fees and costs.”151 The court 
went on to hold that because the parties had different inten-
tions, “[n]o mutual assent was shown to the same terms so 
there was no valid offer and acceptance under Rule 68.”152 The 
court then vacated the judgment that had been entered by the 
district court on behalf of the plaintiff—for $4500 plus attor-
neys’ fees of approximately $31,000—and remanded the case to 
the district court.153 
 
 146. 130 F.R.D. 60, 63 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 148 F.3d 937, 939−40 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 150. Id. at 938. 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. at 939. 
 153. See id. at 939−40 (vacating the Rule 68 judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b), which allows a court to vacate any judgment on grounds of exceptional 
circumstances). For a discussion of the uncertainty that arises from using Rule 
60 to negate the automatic operation of Rule 68, see infra note 208. 
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Other courts have gone a step further and held that a Rule 
68 offer that is silent as to costs is nevertheless inclusive of 
such costs. For example, the court in Blumel v. Mylander con-
cluded that an offer for $501 “to settle all pending claims” was 
inclusive of costs.154 The court in particular noted the “large 
disparity” between the amount of the offer ($501) and the addi-
tional amount sought for costs including fees ($5162.50).155 In 
another case, McCain v. Detroit II Auto Finance Center, Inc., 
the district court similarly concluded that an offer that did not 
mention costs was “sufficiently clear” in including costs.156 The 
court reasoned that because the offer was for “$3,000.00 as to 
all claims and causes of actions for this case,” it was clear that 
the defendant intended the settlement to be for one lump 
sum.157 
A party seeking certainty about how a court would inter-
pret a Rule 68 offer would gain little assurance from these 
cases. The inconsistency between these cases casts doubt on 
how a court, especially one that has not addressed this issue, 
would rule. While one case (Rohrer) makes clear that the inter-
pretation of a Rule 68 offer does “not [depend on] whether the 
parties’ minds have met on each component of the judg-
ment,”158 another case (Stewart) expressly bases its holding on 
the lack of any such meeting of the minds.159 Other cases—
Blumel as well as the district court’s opinion in McCain—create 
another level of uncertainty that stems from the potential that 
a court may read costs into the terms of a Rule 68 offer that 
does not even mention them.160 A plaintiff cannot reasonably 
 
 154. 165 F.R.D. 113, 115−16 (M.D. Fla. 1996). 
 155. Id. at 116. 
 156. 228 F. Supp. 2d 799, 801 (E.D. Mich. 2002), rev’d in part and aff ’d in 
part, 378 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 157. Id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on 
attorneys’ fees, holding that the defendant’s “silence on the subject of costs in 
its Rule 68 offer” meant that costs were not included in the offer. McCain, 378 
F.3d 561, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Marek as standing for the proposition that 
costs are not included in an offer unless the offer so states). This holding is 
similar to Rohrer. See supra text accompanying notes 139−44. 
 158. Rohrer v. Slatile Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 655 F. Supp. 736, 738 
(N.D. Ind. 1987). 
 159. See Stewart v. Prof ’l Computer Ctrs., Inc., 148 F.3d 937, 939−40 (8th 
Cir. 1998). 
 160. See McCain, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 801; Blumel v. Mylander, 165 F.R.D. 
113, 116 (M.D. Fla. 1996). As noted above, on appeal the Sixth Circuit held 
that an offer that does not mention costs should not be construed as inclusive 
of costs. McCain, 378 F.3d at 564. In McCain, the plaintiff ultimately recov-
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and fairly value a Rule 68 offer that does not mention costs—
and make a decision to accept or reject it—without knowing if a 
court down the road will read such an offer to include or ex-
clude costs. Still that is precisely what plaintiffs must do, given 
the fact that Rule 68 offers are “non-negotiable” yet consequen-
tial even if rejected.161 
Even apart from the uncertainty created by inconsistencies 
between courts, cases in which courts interpret Rule 68 offers 
by looking at extrinsic evidence, such as Stewart, create uncer-
tainty.162 This uncertainty has not gone unnoticed. According to 
the Seventh Circuit, “[u]nless the defendant allows the plaintiff 
to resolve or eliminate ambiguities, the plaintiff will be forced 
to guess whether and how the court would interpret the extrin-
sic evidence.”163 Besides being unfair to plaintiffs, courts’ con-
sideration of extrinsic evidence—namely, evidence regarding 
defendants’ intentions—has another price. It opens the door to 
“collateral proceedings [that] would undermine entirely the 
purpose of the rule.”164 Instead of “encouraging settlement and 
avoiding protracted litigation,” Rule 68 offers, when left open to 
courts’ interpretations, breed their own litigation.165 
 
ered her $150 in costs, which undoubtedly pales in comparison to the post-
offer attorneys’ fees she incurred in litigating the Rule 68 issues. See id. at 
566. In a related but separate issue in the case, the court held that the plain-
tiff could not recover her attorneys’ fees in addition to the amount of the offer. 
See McCain v. Detroit II Auto Finance Center, 378 F.3d 561, 563, 565 (2004). 
 161. See Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 68 oper-
ates automatically.”); Nusom v. COMH Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 834 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he offer, once made, is non-negotiable.”).  
 162. See, e.g., Said v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 130 F.R.D. 60, 63 (E.D. Va. 
1990) (“Because of the difficulty of the choice that an offer of judgment re-
quires a claimant to make, it is essential that he be able to discern with cer-
tainty what the precise terms of that offer are.”). 
 163. Webb, 147 F.3d at 621 (quoting Shorter v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 
678 F. Supp. 714, 719−20 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). The court went on to state that 
“[a]dherence to the language of the offer whenever possible alleviates this un-
fairness to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Shorter, 678 F. Supp. at 719−20). While 
true, this has not been the consistent view of courts interpreting such offers, 
which is why the rule itself needs to be amended to guide courts, and thus liti-
gants, in interpreting such offers. 
 164. Sas v. Trintex, 709 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that the court “must determine what [the defendant’s] 
intentions were in making the offer and what the plaintiff ’s assumptions were 
in accepting it”); see also Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 843 N.E.2d 706, 
715 n.15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (“[T]he prospect of collateral proceedings 
weighing extrinsic evidence on an offeror’s claim that its offer was intended to 
mean something other than expressed in its unambiguous terms seems par-
ticularly at odds with the purpose of the rule.”). 
 165. See Webb, 147 F.3d at 621 (refusing to “consider challenges to the 
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2. Whether the Amount of the Offer Includes Attorneys’ Fees 
It is curious that, while many Rule 68 offers hinge on the 
question of attorneys’ fees, the Rule itself does not mention the 
term “attorneys’ fees.” Indeed nothing in the text of the rule 
alerts a litigant to the significance of attorneys’ fees in the 
drafting and evaluation of an offer. As one commentator frames 
the issue: 
One of the ironies of Rule 68 is that a lawyer just reading the rule 
would not see its major consequence because the rule has never been 
amended to state what Marek v. Chesny holds . . . that is in a federal 
fee recovery case when the rule is triggered the plaintiff forfeits not 
only post-offer costs but also post-offer fees.166 
Given the lack of guidance and notice in the rule, it is not 
surprising that much collateral litigation under the current 
rule relates to the availability of attorneys’ fees in relation to 
Rule 68 offers.167 
While Marek v. Chesny holds that defendants must always 
include “costs” in the amount of the offer or the court will add 
them on, no uniform requirement exists regarding whether of-
fers must include attorneys’ fees. Instead, the question of 
whether an offer must or does include attorneys’ fees hinges on 
the type of case and, specifically, how the underlying statute in 
that case defines attorneys’ fees. While most commentators 
agree that it at least somewhat “bizarre” to make the question 
of Rule 68’s treatment of attorneys’ fees depend on whether a 
“particular statute happens to have chosen to express the right 
to attorneys’ fees as costs or not,” that law is well-established 
under the legacy of Marek.168 
 
terms of a Rule 68 offer [because] [s]uch challenges undermine the [r]ule’s 
purpose of encouraging settlement and avoiding protracted litigation”). 
 166. Symposium, Revitalizing FRCP 68: Can Offer of Judgment Provide 
Adequate Incentives for Fair, Early Settlement of Fee-Recovery Cases? Session 
Two: “Utilization and Alternatives to Rule 68,” 57 MERCER L. REV. 771, 786 
(2006). 
 167. See Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 
F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Rule 68 does not define the meaning of the 
term ‘costs,’ however, and consequently parties frequently dispute whether 
attorneys’ fees are included.”). 
 168. Symposium, supra note 59, at 811 (comments of Professor Edward H. 
Cooper, who serves on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and has exten-
sively explored Rule 68). While many scholars agree that the practical implica-
tion of Marek is “bizarre,” that result is not an indictment on Marek itself. In 
Marek, the Court obviously had to interpret the rule as drafted, and the “bi-
zarre” implications of Marek may simply call for amending the text of the rule. 
See Cooper, supra note 13, at 851 (emphasizing that there is no legal barrier to 
amending the rule to change Marek’s outcome, because Marek’s holding was 
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Thus, when the underlying statute defines attorneys’ fees 
as “costs,” as many civil rights and copyright statutes do, then 
attorneys’ fees,169 like costs, must be included in the offer.170 If, 
on the other hand, the underlying statute provides for attor-
neys’ fees as separate from costs, then there is no requirement 
that the offer include such fees. The fact that the defendant is 
not required to include fees does not mean that that these cases 
do not present complex questions regarding whether the offer 
includes fees. Indeed, as discussed in Part II.C.2.b below, the 
complexities and confusion from these cases is perhaps height-
ened, primarily because litigants face uncertainty regarding 
how courts will construe offers that are “silent” as to fees. 
a. When Attorneys’ Fees Are Defined as “Costs”: Uncertainty in 
Fees-as-Costs Cases 
In theory, when a statute defines attorneys’ fees as costs, 
there should be no uncertainty regarding whether such fees are 
included, other than the typical uncertainty regarding costs 
themselves.171 The sole inquiry would seem to be whether costs 
are included or not, with the availability of attorneys’ fees hing-
ing on that answer. However, two types of confusion still arise. 
First, despite Marek, some litigants still fail to recognize that, 
when the underlying statute defines attorneys’ fees as costs, 
the Rule 68 offer will be interpreted to treat attorneys’ fees ex-
actly as it does costs.172 That is, if the court deems the offer to 
be lump-sum and thus inclusive of costs, it will by the same 
measure deem the offer to be inclusive of attorneys’ fees which 
are a part of costs. Alternately, if the offer is for a dollar 
 
dependent on the rule and not, for example, a constitutional issue). 
 169. For a comprehensive listing of statutes that define attorneys’ fees as a 
“cost” and those that define attorneys’ fees as separate from costs, see Bonney, 
supra note 21, at 414 n.245, 422. For a less comprehensive but more up-to-
date listing, see MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68.02[4], at 68-10 nn.14−15. 
See also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43−48 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(categorizing and listing various fees-shifting statutes). 
 170. Indeed, an offer that seeks to limit costs to “court costs, but not attor-
neys’ fees” under a fees-as-costs statute will be held invalid. See, e.g., Bentley 
v. Bolger, 110 F.R.D. 108, 111−14 (C.D. Ill. 1986). 
 171. As discussed above in Part II.C.1, there is considerable uncertainty 
regarding how offers are interpreted with regard to costs. 
 172. See Cooper, supra note 13, at 849 (“There is a real concern that some 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, confronted with the unfamiliar beast of a formal Rule 68 
offer, will read the rule and escape without any inkling of the most serious 
consequence that may flow from rejection. Is there no principle of fair notice 
that requires the rule to spell out this consequence?”). 
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amount that the court deems is not inclusive of costs, then it 
similarly will not deem the amount to be inclusive of attorneys’ 
fees.173 Second, confusion also exists as to whether the underly-
ing statute that provides for attorneys’ fees defines attorneys’ 
fees as costs. Such confusion may arise because the statute is 
unclear in defining attorneys’ fees or because the plaintiff ’s 
pleadings are unclear as to the claims raised. 
i. Confusion About Fees-as-Costs 
Although the Supreme Court decided Marek decades ago, 
litigants still make, accept, and refuse Rule 68 offers without 
recognizing the consequences regarding recovery of attorneys’ 
fees. For example, in Erdman v. Cochise County, the defendant 
made a Rule 68 offer for “$7,500 with costs now accrued.”174 
The offer was made pursuant to a claim under 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1983, the fee provision of which defines attorneys’ fees as 
costs.175 The defendant was surprised when the plaintiff, after 
accepting the offer, sought a five-figure attorney fee award in 
addition to the specific amount offered. The defendant raised 
two arguments, both of which the court rejected. First, it ar-
gued that “‘with costs’ was intended to mean ‘including costs’ 
rather than ‘plus costs.’”176 The court did not address this ar-
gument, except to implicitly reject it.177 
Second, the defendant argued that it did not realize the 
implication of Marek that “costs” in actions under § 1983 auto-
matically include attorneys’ fees.178 The court rejected the de-
fendant’s argument, found that the defendant had made a 
“drafting error,” and held that the offer “should be construed 
against [the defendant], rather than against the plaintiff.”179 
Thus, the defendant was not allowed to withdraw its offer 
based upon its mistake and instead was required to pay, in ad-
 
 173. However, this same conclusion may not be true if the offer is made 
based upon a claim in which the underlying statute does not define fees as 
costs. Under such circumstances, courts have differed as to how to interpret 
offers that are “silent” as to attorneys’ fees. Id.; see infra Part II.C.2.b. 
 174. 926 F.2d 877, 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 175. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). 
 176. Erdman, 926 F.2d at 879−80. 
 177. See id.; see also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing confusion that arises in 
cases regarding meaning of Rule 68 offer’s language for certain dollar amount 
“with costs”). 
 178. See id. at 879. 
 179. Id. 
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dition to the amount of the offer, the plaintiff ’s costs, including 
his attorneys’ fees. 
The problem of litigants failing to understand the implica-
tion of Marek is not passing with time. In a recent decision, 
Henderson v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., the court rejected 
the defendant’s attempt to vacate a Rule 68 judgment on 
grounds that the defendant had been mistaken as to the conse-
quences of its offer language under Marek.180 Nor is the prob-
lem limited to defendants. One commentator recently expressed 
concern that a plaintiff, “confronted with the unfamiliar beast 
of a formal Rule 68 offer, will read the rule and escape without 
any inkling of the most serious consequence that may flow from 
rejection.”181 Thus litigants, unaware from the face of the rule 
what implications an offer may have with regard to fees, may 
draft and evaluate offers that leave the issue of fees unclear or, 
in the eyes of the court, clear, although not what the litigant in-
tended. 
ii. Confusion About Attorney Fee Provisions in Particular 
Cases 
Other uncertainty arises in fees-as-costs cases due to con-
fusion about whether the claims for which the offer is made ac-
tually define fees as costs. For example, although fees are de-
fined as costs in most actions arising under Title VII, that is 
not uniformly the case. The attorneys’ fee provision for Title 
VII mixed-motive claims allows recovery of “attorneys’ fees and 
costs.”182 As such, litigants who assume that an offer for costs is 
inclusive of attorneys’ fees in every Title VII action may end up 
making, accepting, and rejecting offers without knowing all of 
the implications.183 
Even litigants who make every effort to analyze whether 
an offer is being made pursuant to a fees-as-costs provision face 
 
 180. Henderson, No. 03-CV-0526-CVE-PJC, 2006 WL 1878897, at *5 (N.D. 
Okla. July 6, 2006) (“‘Any effort to research Rule 68 would have alerted an at-
tentive lawyer to the possibility of attorney’s fees being included under the 
rule . . . .’” (quoting Aynes v. Space Guard Prods., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 445, 449 
(S.D. Ind. 2001))). 
 181. Cooper, supra note 13, at 849. 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2000). For a case in which the distinc-
tion between recovery of attorneys’ fees under different parts of Title VII 
arose, see Wilson v. Nomura Securities International, Inc., 361 F.3d 86, 89−90 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
 183. See Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 88 F.3d 1332, 1337 (4th 
Cir. 1996). 
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obstacles. One such obstacle is the complexity that arises when 
offers are made in cases involving multiple claims, when such 
claims define the recovery of attorneys’ fees differently. For ex-
ample, in Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec-
tric Cooperative, Inc., the issue before the court was whether 
attorneys’ fees were a part of “costs” under the offer made.184 
The inquiry was complicated because the lawsuit involved mul-
tiple claims, one of which arguably defined fees-as-costs (breach 
of contract) and the other which did not (trade secret viola-
tion).185 
Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court engaged 
in a lengthy discussion first of whether a contract, rather than 
a statute, could define “costs” for Rule 68 purposes. Because 
Marek “held that the term ‘costs’ in Rule 68 ‘was intended to re-
fer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substan-
tive statute or other authority,’” the court held it is proper un-
der Marek to look to the underlying contract, in a breach of 
contract claim, to determine whether it defines attorneys’ fees 
as costs.186 The Utility Automation 2000 court declined to reach 
the issue of how to resolve the tension inherent in a Rule 68 of-
fer made pursuant to multiple claims that define fees differ-
ently because it ultimately held that neither the statute nor the 
contract underlying the lawsuit defined attorneys’ fees as 
costs.187 
That issue, however, was highlighted in Wilson v. Nomura 
Securities International, Inc.188 In Wilson, the plaintiff accepted 
the defendant’s offer of judgment to settle a racial discrimina-
tion case, which was brought under federal, state, and munici-
pal law.189 The offer stated that it was for “$15,000.00 inclusive 
of all costs available under all local, state or federal statutes 
accrued to date.”190 Complications arose because the statutes 
under which the plaintiff ’s claims were brought defined attor-
 
 184. See 298 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 185. See id. at 1245. The court quickly dismissed the argument that the 
trade secret act defined attorney fees, absent willful misappropriation, as 
costs. See id. 
 186. Id. (quoting Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). 
 187. See id. at 1246; see also Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu-Mar Lobster & 
Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying an award of at-
torneys’ fees to a plaintiff who accepted a Rule 68 offer in a multi-count case in 
which only one of the twelve counts provided for attorneys’ fees). 
 188. 361 F.3d 86, 89–91 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id. at 88. 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
2007] REWRITING RULE 68 901 
 
neys’ fees differently.191 The municipal law under which the 
plaintiff sought relief did not define attorneys’ fees as costs.192 
Thus, the plaintiff argued that the offer was not inclusive of 
such fees,193 and she sought to recover some attorneys’ fees in 
addition to the offer.194 The court disagreed and held that no 
additional fees should be awarded.195 Specifically, the court 
held that the applicable federal law was one in which fees were 
defined as costs (and thus clearly included in the offer already) 
and that the municipal claim was “factually and legally identi-
cal” to the federal claim.196 The dissent argued that the plaintiff 
should be able to recover at least some additional fees based 
upon the municipal claim, because the plain language of the of-
fer left open that possibility.197 
These cases illustrate the type of collateral litigation that 
occurs regarding disputes over whether attorneys’ fees are 
properly awarded as costs. In some of these cases, the uncer-
tainty and thus collateral litigation arises because unsophisti-
cated litigants make and evaluate Rule 68 offers without re-
gard to the nuances revolving around costs and, in turn, fees. 
In other cases, the uncertainties are intrinsic to the current 
rule, especially for Rule 68 settlements of multi-count claims 
when the underlying fee statutes define fees differently. While 
the Wilson case provides one example of the type of dispute 
that occurs in such a multi-count case, the possibilities are nu-
merous for confusion and complicated legal analysis.198 Yet be-
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. The plaintiff also argued that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees 
under Title VII’s mixed-motives prong—which defines fees as separate from 
costs. See id. at 89−90. The court rejected that argument. See id. 
 193. For a more complete discussion of the recovery of attorneys’ fees when 
the offer is silent in fees-as-separate-from-costs cases, see infra Part II.C.2.b. 
 194. The question of the extent of the plaintiff ’s entitlement to a fee award 
is somewhat complicated. According to the dissent in Wilson, the plaintiff ’s fee 
award under the municipal law would have to be offset by “whatever part of 
the settlement amount [the defendants] can show should be attributed to set-
tlement of the claim for attorney’s fees under federal law.” 361 F.3d at 93 
(Newman, J., dissenting). It is not clear how courts would accomplish this, or, 
even if they could, that this would be the proper approach. 
 195. See id. at 90–91. 
 196. Id. at 91. 
 197. See id. at 93 (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to the attorneys’ fees 
claim under the municipal law as “indisputably outside” of the Rule 68 offer). 
 198. While the dissent in Wilson points out that a “careful lawyer[ ]” would 
have drafted the offer to be “inclusive of costs and attorney’s fees,” id. at 91, 
the fact remains that the rule itself does not alert lawyers to this requirement 
in any way, nor does the case law. Indeed, if the various laws under which the 
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cause so much of the Rule 68 offer rests on what is a “cost,” it is 
inevitable that such litigation will continue under the current 
rule. 
b. When Attorneys’ Fees Are Not Defined as “Costs”: 
Uncertainty in Fees-as-Separate-from-Costs Cases 
In the fees-as-costs cases described above, the uncertainty 
stems from whether fees are defined as costs in the underlying 
statute or contract. Once the court makes that determination, 
the attorneys’ fees question is bootstrapped onto the costs ques-
tion. The court looks to see what the offer says about costs. If 
the offer says nothing, the court adds costs (and fees defined as 
costs) on to the amount of the offer. Much less clarity exists re-
garding how a court will construe an offer with regard to fees in 
cases where attorneys’ fees are not defined as costs.199 In such 
cases, two levels of uncertainty arise—first, uncertainty arises 
in the determination of whether fees are defined as costs and, if 
fees are not defined as costs, an additional uncertainty arises in 
the determination of whether fees (separate from the matter of 
costs) were part of the offer. 
When attorneys’ fees are not part of costs, a defendant un-
der the current rule is not required to include—either explicitly 
or implicitly—such fees as part of its Rule 68 offer. Unlike 
costs, such attorneys’ fees will not automatically be added on if 
not included in the offer. Defendants can, and sometimes do, 
make offers that specifically provide that no attorneys’ fees 
should be added on to the amount of the offer.200 Still, many of-
fers fail to make this exclusion explicit. And because no default 
exists regarding how to construe an offer’s silence regarding at-
torneys’ fees, litigants face a conundrum—will the court treat 
the offer as a lump sum settlement and thus inclusive of any 
applicable attorneys’ fees, or will the court interpret the offer’s 
silence on the issue of attorneys’ fees as leaving the door open 
 
plaintiff sought relief in Wilson all defined fees as costs, the offer would clearly 
have been inclusive of fees.  
 199. The question of whether attorneys’ fees are included as part of a Rule 
68 offer arises only in cases in which attorneys’ fees are provided for in some 
way by the underlying statute or contract. In cases in which no right to attor-
neys’ fees exists, a Rule 68 offer’s silence with regard to attorneys’ fees would 
be construed as not inclusive of fees. 
 200. See Fisher, supra note 32, at 104 (describing a proposed form for a 
Rule 68 offer that makes it clear that fees are not to be added on in fees-as-
separate-from-costs cases). 
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to recovery of such fees? As discussed below, no clear and read-
ily available answers exist for a litigant facing this issue.201 
i. Offers That Are Deemed Ambiguous Regarding 
Attorneys’ Fees 
When an offer is silent as to attorneys’ fees, some courts 
have held that the plaintiff may recover such fees.202 Specifi-
cally, “‘where the underlying statute does not make attorney 
fees part of costs, it is incumbent on the defendant making a 
Rule 68 offer to state clearly that attorney fees are included as 
part of the total sum for which judgment may be entered.’”203 A 
defendant who fails to do so risks “exposure to attorney fees in 
addition to the sum offered plus costs.”204 If the defendant does 
not so specify, the court may add attorneys’ fees on to the 
amount of the offer.205 Accordingly, in Webb v. James, the court 
 
 201. See id. at 98 (“Defendants should be especially wary of situations in 
which the underlying substantive statute mandates a plaintiff ’s recovery of 
fees separately from costs.”). 
 202. Notably, the question of whether a plaintiff may recover attorneys’ 
fees in addition to the amount of the offer when such fees are not defined as 
costs arises only in the context of accepted offers. For offers that are rejected, 
even if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less favorable than the offer, 
only costs shift. If costs do not include attorneys’ fees, such fees are not cut off. 
Still, the plaintiff ’s rejection of the offer may be considered by the court in de-
termining the reasonable amount for any fee award. See, e.g., Sheppard v. 
Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 88 F.3d 1332, 1337 (4th Cir. 1996) (considering 
rejection of a Rule 68 offer in determining the propriety and amount of an at-
torneys’ fees award where the statute treated attorneys’ fees as separate from 
costs). 
 203. Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 
1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nusom v. COMH Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 
830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Sampson v. Embassy Suites, Inc., No. Civ. A. 
95-7794, 1998 WL 726649, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1998) (citing Webb v. 
James, 172 F.R.D. 311, 314–16 (N.D. Ill. 1997)) (holding that the burden is on 
the defendant to “clearly specify that the offer includes attorney’s fees”). 
 204. Nusom, 122 F.3d at 834. Some courts, like the Ninth Circuit, discuss 
the question of how to construe an offer in a fees-as-separate-from-costs case 
when the offer is silent as to attorneys’ fees as one of waiver. In Nusom, the 
court construed a Rule 68 offer and held that any waiver of statutory attor-
neys’ fees must be “clear and unambiguous” and that if the offer is ambiguous 
the defendant must show that both parties intended a waiver. Id. at 833; see 
also Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 205. The entitlement to attorneys’ fees in these cases stems not from Rule 
68, which requires the court to award “costs then accrued,” but instead from 
the underlying fee-shifting statute or contract. MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, 
§ 68.02[4], at 68-11 to -12. Even so, it is not a certainty that such fees will be 
added on. The plaintiff still must show, under the relevant fee statute, that 
she is entitled to attorneys’ fees, which frequently requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that she is the “prevailing party.” See, e.g., Nusom, 122 F.3d at 
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allowed the plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees in addition to the 
amount of the Rule 68 offer when the offer was for “judgment in 
the . . . amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000)” and made 
no reference to costs or fees.206 
The Seventh Circuit noted that the underlying statute in 
that case did not define attorneys’ fees as costs, but did sepa-
rately provide for the recovery of such fees to the “prevailing 
party.”207 The court squarely placed the burden on defendants 
to “make clear whether the offer is inclusive of fees when the 
underlying statute provides fees for the prevailing party.”208 
Because the defendant could have, but did not, draft a lump-
sum settlement inclusive of costs and fees, the court reasoned it 
was fair to award an additional amount to cover fees.209 
 
833. Ordinarily, a Rule 68 judgment is sufficient to demonstrate prevailing 
party status; however, fees may not be awarded if the Rule 68 judgment 
merely reflects a nuisance settlement. See, e.g., Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 
162 F.3d 975, 976–78 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding in a § 1983 action that plaintiffs 
were not entitled to attorneys’ fees because the accepted offer reflected a nui-
sance settlement). 
 206. 147 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 1998); see also supra note 145 (discussing 
the Webb court’s holding that the plaintiff was allowed to recover costs in ad-
dition to the amount of the offer). 
 207. Webb, 147 F.3d at 622 (applying Rule 68 to a claim involving the 
Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 208. Id. at 623. In addition to arguing that the defendant was entitled to 
relief under Rule 68, the defendant in Webb also argued that it should be re-
lieved from the unintended consequences of the Rule 68 judgment under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60. See id. at 619–20. The court agreed, holding 
that the defendant appropriately sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1) based upon 
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Id. at 622. Even so, the 
court provided no such relief, and instead concluded that it was within the dis-
trict court’s discretion to find that the defendant’s neglect was not excusable 
because “Rule 68 itself alerts the reader to the issue of costs, the ADA provi-
sion granting attorney’s fees is clear and unambiguous, and Marek was de-
cided in 1985, more than a decade before [the defendant] extended its offer of 
judgment.” Id. 
Despite Webb’s ultimate holding, the court’s decision on the Rule 60 issue 
opens the door to collateral litigation on Rule 68 judgment, albeit under Rule 
60 rather than Rule 68 more limited in scope. The amendments proposed in 
this Article would decrease the likelihood of defendants succeeding under, and 
thus bringing, a Rule 60 argument to undo a Rule 68 judgment. The text of the 
revised rule itself would alert the defendant to the issue of attorneys’ fees, 
making any neglect by defendants even less excusable. 
 209. See Kelm v. Arlington Heights Park Dist., No. 98 C 4786, 2000 WL 
1508240, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2000) (mem.) (awarding attorneys’ fees in 
addition to an offer for “judgment to the plaintiff in the sum of Twenty Thou-
sand and 0/100 Dollars ($20,000.00)” because the offer “is unclear about 
whether attorney’s fees are included in the $20,000 Offer of Judgment or not”). 
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Like the Webb court, other courts have concluded that an 
offer that is silent regarding attorneys’ fees is not inclusive of 
such fees. In Utility Automation 2000, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that an offer for “the sum of Forty-five thousand and 
00/100 Dollars ($45,000) with costs accrued” was not inclusive 
of attorneys’ fees.210 First, the court held that under the statute 
at issue attorneys’ fees were not defined as costs.211 Next, the 
court analyzed whether, like the plaintiff in Webb, the plaintiff 
could recover attorneys’ fees in addition to the amount of the 
offer.212 The court held that it could.213 It pointed out that “the 
offer says nothing one way or the other about fees; attorneys’ 
fees are not mentioned at all.”214 Thus, the court concluded, 
“[W]e—much as the offerees—are left to speculate whether the 
offer was intended to include attorneys’ fees or not.”215 Because 
a “Rule 68 offeree is at the mercy of the offeror’s choice of lan-
guage,” any ambiguity must be construed against the defen-
dant.216 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff would be 
allowed to seek attorneys’ fees in addition to the amount of the 
accepted offer.217 
 
 210. Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 
1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 211. See id. at 1244–45; see supra Part II.C.1 (describing cases in which 
courts determined whether costs are included). 
 212. See Util. Automation 2000, 298 F.3d at 1247. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 1244. 
 215. Id. In following Webb, the Eleventh Circuit had to distinguish its own 
precedent set by Arencibia v. Miami Shoes, Inc., 113 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 
1997). In Arencibia, the offer was “in the amount of $4,000” and made no ref-
erence to costs or attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1213. The court held that the plaintiff 
could obtain costs in addition to the amount of the offer, but not attorneys’ fees 
(which were not defined as costs under the statute in that case). See id. at 
1214. In explaining why the plaintiff in Utility Automation 2000 could seek 
fees whereas the plaintiff in Arencibia could not, the Utility Automation 2000 
court stated that the difference was in the issue presented to the court: “The 
only issue before this Court in Arencibia was whether the district court could 
grant attorneys’ fees as costs ‘by virtue of Rule 68.’” 298 F.3d at 1242 (quoting 
Arencibia, 113 F.3d at 1214). 
 216. Util. Automation 2000, 298 F.3d at 1244; see also Nusom v. COMH 
Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that where the ac-
cepted offer is silent as to fees, the plaintiff is entitled to seek attorneys’ fees 
in addition to the amount of the offer if the underlying statute provides for at-
torneys’ fees, in addition to costs, to the “prevailing party”). 
 217. The court left open for remand whether the amount of attorneys’ fees 
sought by plaintiff (approximately $61,000) was reasonable. Util. Automation 
2000, 298 F.3d at 1249. 
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But the apparent bright lines from these decisions are not 
really so bright because other courts have reached opposite 
conclusions, even when faced with similar offer language.218 In 
particular, some courts have held offers that are silent as to 
fees to be unenforceable because they are ambiguous; other 
courts have held that certain offers that are silent as to fees are 
“unambiguously” inclusive of such fees.219 Other courts have 
held that such offers are revocable by the offeror on grounds 
that the offeror was mistaken as to the fact that the offer was 
not inclusive of attorneys’ fees.220 The result is considerable un-
certainty about how a court will interpret an offer that is silent 
as to fees.221 
Rather than construing ambiguity in the offer regarding 
whether fees are included against the defendant, as did the 
court in Webb, other courts have used the offer’s ambiguity as 
grounds to consider extrinsic evidence as to what the parties 
intended regarding fees.222 Specifically, the court in Radecki v. 
 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 223–27 (discussing Radecki v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 231–36 (discussing Nordby v. An-
chor Hocking Packaging Co., 199 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 220. See Fisher v. Stolaruk Corp., 110 F.R.D. 74, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (al-
lowing an offeror to revoke an accepted Rule 68 offer for “$5,000 ‘with costs 
then accrued’” when the offeror mistakenly believed that “costs” included at-
torney’s fees under the claim at issue). 
 221. The issues that arise in fees-separate-from-costs cases in which the 
offer is silent in some ways parallel the issues that arise with regard to the 
inclusion of costs when offers are silent with regard to costs. See supra Part 
II.C.1. 
 222. Some courts and commentators contend that these different rulings do 
not reflect inconsistency, but instead merely reflect differences between the 
cases. The contention asserts that the cases are consistent because in all cases 
the courts apply “contract law [such] that, absent parol evidence as to the 
meaning of an ambiguous term, ambiguous terms of a contract are construed 
against the drafter of the contract.” Hennessy v. Daniels Law Office, 270 F.3d 
551, 553–54 (8th Cir. 2001); see also WILLIAM W SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFOR-
NIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 15:155.3 
(2006) (explaining the treatment of ambiguous Rule 68 offers). 
While the search for consistency in the rule’s application is noble, no uni-
fying theory exists that adequately captures the holdings of the cases. For ex-
ample, in contrast to Radecki and Basha, both Webb and Utility Automation 
2000 held it inappropriate for a court to consider extrinsic evidence of an of-
fer’s alleged ambiguity. Compare Basha v. Mitsubishi Motor Credit of Am., 
Inc., 336 F.3d 451, 454 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003) (commenting that the Radecki court 
also “conducted a review of extrinsic evidence”), and Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 
858 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding the offer ambiguous even after “re-
viewing all the evidence”), with Util. Automation 2000, 298 F.3d at 1244–46 
(relying solely on the offer’s language to determine the plaintiff ’s entitlement 
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Amoco Oil Co. rejected the plaintiff ’s argument that the offer’s 
silence as to fees should be conclusive that fees were not in-
cluded.223 Instead, the court reasoned that “it runs counter to 
the purpose of Rule 68 to assume that forms of relief not men-
tioned are not intended to be included within the sum of-
fered.”224 Thus, the court considered extrinsic evidence of the 
parties’ pre-offer settlement discussions.225 After “[c]arefully 
reviewing all of the evidence,” the court held that it was “firmly 
convinced that [the defendant] intended to include attorney 
fees in its . . . offer.”226 Finding “no mutual assent, and hence no 
binding agreement,” the court vacated the Rule 68 judgment 
and remanded the case to the district court “for the parties to 
approach the settlement question anew.”227 
 
to attorneys’ fees), and Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1998) (as-
serting the soundness of “refus[ing] to consider challenges to the terms of a 
Rule 68 offer”). Specifically, in Utility Automation 2000, the court emphasized 
that “the responsibility for clarity and precision in the offer must reside with 
the offeror” and “any ambiguity in the terms of an offer must be resolved 
against its drafter, and therefore, absent a clear indication to the contrary the 
accepting party cannot be deemed to have received its fees or waived the right 
to seek them.” 298 F.3d at 1244 (citing Nusom, 122 F.3d at 835). Similarly, in 
Webb, the Seventh Circuit stated that “‘[u]nless the defendant allows the 
plaintiff to resolve or eliminate ambiguities, the plaintiff will be forced to 
guess whether and how the court would interpret the extrinsic evidence. Ad-
herence to the language of the offer whenever possible alleviates this unfair-
ness to the plaintiff.’” 147 F.3d at 621 (quoting Shorter v. Valley Bank & Trust 
Co., 678 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). That holding is likely why the Sev-
enth Circuit in Nordby, bound by its precedent in Webb, concluded that the 
offer in the Nordby case was unambiguous (in favor of the defendant) in order 
to reach the result it did. See Nordby v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Co., 199 
F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1999). 
In any event, it matters little to practitioners and their clients whether, as 
claimed by some, the law is consistent yet applied in unique ways to inconsis-
tent facts or whether the law itself is inconsistent. Either way, the uncer-
tainty, expense, and unfairness that often result from the rule’s application 
significantly deter practitioners and clients from using the rule. 
 223. 858 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1988) (resorting to “factors outside the 
words themselves” to determine whether the defendant’s offer was intended to 
include attorneys’ fees since the offer itself did not address them). 
 224. Id. at 401. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 402. 
 227. One of the judges in Radecki would have enforced the Rule 68 offer as 
inclusive of costs. See id. at 403 (Fairchild, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (“[A]n offer of judgment for a specified sum, including costs, necessarily 
means that if the offer be accepted, the resulting judgment will be for the 
specified sum, without addition of an attorney’s fee whether or not the attor-
ney’s fee is a part of costs.”). 
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Other courts have taken Radecki a step further and have 
held that offers that are silent as to fees are nonetheless inclu-
sive of such fees. Instead of finding “no mutual assent,” these 
courts have affirmatively interpreted the offer to be inclusive of 
fees. For example, in Basha v. Mitsubishi Motor Credit of Amer-
ica, Inc., the court affirmed the district court’s refusal to award 
attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who had accepted a Rule 68 “offer 
to pay plaintiff $2,000.”228 In doing so, it stated: “Although the 
. . . offer does not expressly address attorney[s’] fees, we agree 
with the district court that the circumstances surrounding the 
offer, if not the text itself, strongly support the view that the 
parties intended to settle all claims, including those for attor-
ney[s’] fees.”229 Thus, the court affirmed the judgment entered 
on the offer, as well as the district court’s denial of attorneys’ 
fees.230 
ii. Offers That Are Deemed Unambiguous Regarding 
Attorneys’ Fees 
Other courts have enforced Rule 68 offers that are silent as 
to fees as being inclusive of such fees when the offer is “com-
pletely unambiguous” in including fees.231 In Nordby v. Anchor 
Hocking Packaging Co., the Seventh Circuit held that an offer 
that did not explicitly refer to attorneys’ fees was nonetheless 
“unambiguously” inclusive of such fees.232 Had the court found 
the offer to be ambiguous, it would have been forced, based 
upon its holding in Webb, to construe the offer against the de-
fendant.233 Instead, the court distinguished the offer from that 
 
 228. 336 F.3d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 229. Id. at 453–54. 
 230. Id. at 455. The short opinion in Basha leaves unclear the precise basis 
for the court’s holding. While the court calls attention to extrinsic evidence re-
garding the pre-offer settlement talks, suggesting that it found the offer to be 
ambiguous and thus resorted to extrinsic evidence, it also indicates that “the 
text itself” may make clear that fees are included in the offer. Id. at 454. Thus, 
it is likely that litigants will attempt to use Basha to show that courts should 
interpret an offer for a plain dollar amount, with no explicit reference to fees 
or anything suggesting a lump sum settlement, as inclusive of fees, even ab-
sent any supporting extrinsic evidence. 
 231. Nordby v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Co., 199 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 232. See id. at 393 (rejecting a magic-words approach that would require a 
defendant to mention attorneys’ fees expressly in favor of an approach that 
“gives effect to an unambiguous offer even if it does not mention attorneys’ 
fees explicitly”). 
 233. See id. at 391. 
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in Webb, holding that this offer was for “$56,003.00 plus $1,000 
in costs as one total sum as to all counts of the amended com-
plaint.”234 Because one of the counts specifically sought relief 
for attorneys’ fees, the court held that such relief was unambi-
guously encompassed by the offer.235 Unlike the offer in Webb, 
which did not make clear that it was all-encompassing, the 
court held that the offer in Nordby left no room for doubt about 
its lump-sum nature.236 
All of these cases leave litigants wrestling with uncertainty 
about how a court will construe a Rule 68 offer. First, it is un-
clear when a court will construe a Rule 68 offer as “completely 
unambiguous” with regard to the inclusion of fees. Nordby itself 
highlights this type of uncertainty. Rather than providing a 
bright line to alert litigants to what makes an offer inclusive of 
fees, these cases provide litigants with a blurred line between 
what makes an offer “ambiguous” as in Webb and what makes 
it “completely unambiguous” as in Nordby.237 And while a liti-
gant who engages in substantial research will learn from these 
precedents that an offer of “one total sum as to all counts of the 
amended complaint” is inclusive of fees when one count specifi-
cally seeks relief for attorneys’ fees, she will be left with uncer-
tainty should she receive an offer for, say, “$25,000 in total set-
tlement.”238 Any deviation in the language creates ambiguity. 
 
 234. Id. at 391–92 (comparing the offers in Webb and Nordby). 
 235. See id. at 391. 
 236. See id. at 392. For yet another twist in the case law in this area, see 
Barrow v. Greenville Independent School District, No. 3:00-CV-0913-D, 2005 
WL 1867292, at *26 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005). Barrow cites Nordby and holds 
that a Rule 68 offer that is silent as to costs in a fees-as-costs case is nonethe-
less inclusive of attorneys’ fees that are defined as costs when the offer for 
$100,000 states that it “encompasses any and all items of damage and recov-
ery sought by Plaintiff, including attorney’s fees.” Id. (quoting the defendant’s 
offer of judgment made on Jan. 18, 2001). 
 237. See Nordby, 199 F.3d at 392. For a discussion of how the question of 
attorneys’ fees plays out in a case in which the offer includes costs but is silent 
as to fees, yet involves claims that arise under both types of fee-shifting stat-
utes, see Wilson v. Nomura Securities International, Inc., 361 F.3d 86, 91 (2d 
Cir. 2004), which denied attorneys’ fees beyond those contained in the offer. 
 238. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also deemed language to be unam-
biguously inclusive of attorneys’ fees in McCain v. Detroit II Auto Finance Cen-
ter, another fees-as-separate-from-costs case. 378 F.3d 561, 563, 565 (6th Cir. 
2004). The McCain court followed Nordby in holding that an offer of “three 
thousand dollars ($3000.00) as to all claims and causes of actions for this case” 
was unambiguous where the underlying claims all sought statutory attorneys’ 
fees. Id. at 563. For a discussion of the costs issue in McCain, see supra Part 
II.C.1.b. 
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But, in fact, application of the rule is not even that 
straightforward. Courts likely will construe even identical lan-
guage in an offer differently depending on the law under which 
the plaintiff seeks a fee award. As the court pointed out in 
Nordby, if the defendant had made the offer instead in a case in 
which “the plaintiff [was] seeking an award of fees under a 
statute or rule or common law principle not cited in any of the 
counts of the complaint,” a different result might have oc-
curred.239 In such a case, “it would be arguable that the refer-
ence to ‘one total sum as to all counts’ did not include such an 
award.”240 And presumably, if it were at least arguable that the 
offer was not inclusive of fees, the court would deem the offer to 
be ambiguous and thus construe it against the defendant as not 
inclusive of fees.241 
Additionally, it is unclear how a court will interpret a Rule 
68 offer that is ambiguous with regard to fees. While some 
courts construe such offers against the defendant without con-
sidering extrinsic evidence, others first consider extrinsic evi-
dence.242 Because not all circuits have addressed the issue, 
many litigants cannot predict what approach their court will 
take. Even litigants who know their court will consider extrin-
sic evidence face considerable uncertainty.243 They do not know 
what the court will determine to be the actual value of the of-
 
 239. Nordby, 199 F.3d at 392–93. 
 240. Id. at 393. 
 241. See id. at 392–93. 
 242. This uncertainty is highlighted by Nusom v. COMH Woodburn, Inc., 
122 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 1997). While Nusom addressed a plaintiff ’s motion for 
fees which the defendant defended solely on grounds of waiver, the court ap-
pears to have left open the possibility that in further proceedings in the dis-
trict court the defendant might introduce extrinsic evidence regarding the par-
ties’ intentions with regard to fees. See id. at 832, 835. Even that possibility is 
unclear, though, because at least two judges on the three-judge panel dis-
agreed about whether such proceedings would be proper on remand. See id. at 
835 (Goodwin, J., concurring). One judge suggested that the court’s opinion 
closed the door to future litigants seeing relief on grounds that there was no 
meeting of the minds “because defendants will now be on notice that they 
must make explicit that their Rule 68 offers include fees.” Id. (Goodwin, J., 
concurring). 
 243. This Article focuses on the uncertainty created by courts that allow 
consideration of extrinsic evidence. But another critique of such decisions is 
that a Rule 68 offer, like a settlement agreement, that denies a plaintiff ’s 
right to attorneys’ fees under § 1983 should be “clear and unambiguous.” 
Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
2007] REWRITING RULE 68 911 
 
fer—inclusive or exclusive of fees—and, as Nordby warns, 
“can’t make an intelligent choice whether to accept it.”244 
3. The Other Side of the Coin: Uncertainty in the 
Interpretation of Offers When Comparing Unaccepted Offers to 
Judgments Obtained 
While many cases dealing with the terms of a Rule 68 offer 
involve an accepted offer, the same issues regarding what an 
offer means arise when an offer is rejected and the defendant 
moves, after trial, to have costs shifted. Specifically, the defen-
dant, who must show that the offer is more favorable than the 
judgment, must demonstrate the terms of the offer to the court 
so that the court may compare the offer to the judgment.245 As 
such, the same disputes about the terms of the offer arise in 
cases involving rejected Rule 68 offers, because the amount of 
the offer is the basis for comparison to the judgment.246 
This type of uncertainty arose in B&H Manufacturing Co. 
v. Bright, where the defendant sought to have costs shifted by 
arguing that the refused Rule 68 offer was more favorable than 
 
 244. Nordby, 199 F.3d at 392 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3002, 
at 94–96) (discussing the interpretation problems associated with Rule 68 of-
fers that stem from the rule’s automatic operation). The discussion in the 
plaintiff ’s brief to the Ninth Circuit in Lu-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc. v. Sea 
Coast Foods, Inc. highlights the uncertainty plaintiffs face. See Brief of Appel-
lant, Lu-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc. v. Sea Coast Foods, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054 
(9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-36156). In that case, fees were not defined as costs, and 
the issue was whether the plaintiff could, having accepted the Rule 68 offer 
that was silent as to fees, recover attorneys’ fees in addition to the amount of 
the offer. Lu-Mar Shrimp & Lobster, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1059. The trial court 
had not allowed recovery of such fees. Id. at 1058. In its brief on appeal, the 
plaintiff ’s counsel explained to the court that he had “struggled to define for 
[plaintiff ] the risks inherent in rejecting [defendant’s] Rule 68 offer.” Brief of 
Appellant, supra, at *20. Ultimately, the plaintiff ’s counsel advised his client 
that fees were not included in the offer and thus could be separately sought 
after accepting the Rule 68 offer, but that such fees would not be available to 
the plaintiff if it recovered at trial less than the amount of the offer. Id. at 
*20–21. Not surprisingly, that advice turned out to be at least partially erro-
neous. See Lu-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1061 (holding that 
while the plaintiff “believes that because it accepted a Rule 68 offer . . . it 
should receive all of its expenditures on this case, including all costs and at-
torneys’ fees,” the plaintiff is wrong). 
 245. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 246. One interesting difference, though, is that in the post-trial cost-
shifting cases, litigants “switch” roles with regard to their arguments about 
the scope of the offer, with defendants now arguing that the offer was not in-
clusive of costs and fees, and plaintiffs arguing it was. See supra note 259 for a 
discussion of this phenomenon. 
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the judgment the plaintiff obtained at trial.247 The rejected of-
fer was for one million dollars plus injunctive relief, but did not 
include costs.248 At trial, the plaintiff recovered only $851,500 
plus injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees.249 Thus, the defendant 
argued that the offer was more favorable. Leaving aside the 
question of the value of the injunctive relief, the court held that 
the relevant comparison was between one million dollars and 
$851,500 plus plaintiff ’s pre-offer attorneys’ fees.250 With attor-
neys’ fees added on to the amount of the judgment, the court 
held that the offer was not more favorable than the judg-
ment.251 
Notably, the relevant apples-to-apples comparison, and 
likely the ultimate outcome pursuant to Rule 68, would have 
been different in B&H Manufacturing Co. had attorneys’ fees 
been defined as costs in the statutes underlying the claims as-
serted.252 Because a Rule 68 offer must include costs—either 
explicitly or implicitly—the court would have deemed the B&H 
offer to have required that costs (and thus attorneys’ fees when 
such fees are defined as “costs”) be added to the amount of the 
offer rather than implicitly included as part of the offer.253 If so, 
the comparison would have been between the one million dol-
lars offered plus pre-offer costs (including attorneys’ fees) and 
the $851,500 judgment plus pre-offer costs (including attorneys’ 
fees). The costs (including attorneys’ fees) would have cancelled 
each other out, making the amount of the offer and the amount 
of the judgment an apples-to-apples comparison.254 
 
 247. No. CVF01-6619 AWI LJO, 2006 WL 547975, at *20–22 (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 3, 2006). 
 248. Id. at *21. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. (finding that the plaintiff obtained $1,044,047.75 at trial, which 
was more than the one million dollar offer). 
 252. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117a (West Supp. 2006) (entitling prevailing plain-
tiffs to recover “the costs of the action,” but only to recover “reasonable attor-
ney fees” in “exceptional cases”). 
 253. See B&H Mfg. Co., 2006 WL 547975, at *21. 
 254. The flip side of this complication, as discussed in Part II.C, relates to 
ascertaining the offer’s scope at the time it is made. For example, imagine that 
B&H Manufacturing Co. involved a plaintiff seeking to evaluate the terms of 
the offer in order to decide whether to accept it, rather than a defendant seek-
ing to demonstrate the offer’s value to show that the rule was triggered. Such 
a plaintiff would have to assess whether costs were included in the offer, and 
whether costs in that case included attorneys’ fees. 
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In other cases, courts have ruled on an offer’s silence as to 
attorneys’ fees in the context of a post-trial motion by the de-
fendant to trigger Rule 68’s cost-shifting mechanism. In Bevard 
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Rule 68’s cost-shifting mechanism was triggered because the 
judgment was less favorable than the Rule 68 offer.255 The 
court’s holding depended on whether it interpreted the Rule 68 
offer as inclusive of attorneys’ fees.256 The court held that the 
offer did not include such fees.257 In doing so, the court followed 
its holding in Nusom v. COMH Woodburn, Inc., a case in which 
it held, in the context of an accepted offer, that “a Rule 68 offer 
for judgment in a specific sum together with costs, which is si-
lent as to attorneys’ fees, does not preclude the plaintiff from 
seeking fees when the underlying statute does not make attor-
neys’ fees a part of costs.”258 While the court’s holding in Nusom 
favored the plaintiff by allowing it to recover attorneys’ fees in 
addition to the amount of the offer, its holding in Bevard disfa-
vored the plaintiff. Specifically, because attorneys’ fees were 
not deemed to be part of the offer, the court also did not, when 
determining the amount of the judgment for purposes of com-
paring it to the offer, include attorneys’ fees as part of that 
judgment.259 As such, the apples-to-apples comparison was 
deemed to be the amount of the offer ($8001, which by its terms 
 
 255. 127 F.3d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 256. See id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. 122 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 259. Bevard, 127 F.3d at 1148. As Bevard as compared to Nusom high-
lights, one difference between those cases involving an accepted Rule 68 offer 
versus a rejected one are the positions the parties take with regard to the 
scope of the offer. A plaintiff seeking to enforce an accepted Rule 68 offer typi-
cally will argue that the offer did not include costs and fees, and will seek to 
recover such costs and fees in addition to the amount of the offer. On the other 
hand, a plaintiff seeking to defend himself from a Rule 68 cost-shifting motion 
based upon an offer he rejected that defendant claims is more favorable than 
the judgment plaintiff obtained at trial typically will argue for a broad and in-
clusive reading of the Rule 68 offer. 
Because the rule’s cost-shifting mechanism is not triggered unless the of-
fer is more than the judgment, the plaintiff will argue that the offer included 
such costs and fees. That way, the relevant apples-to-apples comparison will 
be between the offer amount (again, inclusive of costs and attorneys’ fees) and 
the judgment with pre-offer costs and pre-offer attorneys’ fees added on—a 
much more favorable comparison for the plaintiff than comparing the offer 
amount solely to the judgment. The same switch in viewpoints, of course, oc-
curs among defendants as well, who broadly portray the offer’s scope if it is 
accepted but narrowly portray the offer’s scope if it is rejected. 
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was inclusive of costs) versus the amount of the judgment 
($5625 plus pre-offer costs of $1916).260 
Had the court determined that the offer was inclusive of 
attorneys’ fees as well as costs, then the relevant comparison 
would have been between the “offer” ($8001, inclusive of costs 
and attorneys’ fees) versus the amount of the judgment ($5625 
plus pre-offer costs of $1916 and pre-offer attorneys’ fees). As 
long as the pre-offer attorneys’ fees were more than $460, the 
judgment would have been more favorable than the offer and 
thus the rule’s cost-shifting consequences would not have been 
triggered. 
The court’s decision in Bevard creates uncertainty for 
plaintiffs by construing an offer that is silent as to fees in a 
manner that ultimately is unfavorable for plaintiffs. Unlike the 
cases in which an accepted offer’s silence as to attorneys’ fees is 
used against the drafting defendant, in Bevard the court con-
strued the offer’s silence (and thus ambiguity) against the 
plaintiff.261 In doing so, the court seemed to ignore the reason-
ing of its underlying precedent, Nusom, which held that the de-
fendant must bear the risk of uncertainty in an offer.262 Rather 
than penalizing the defendant for its failure to “state clearly 
that attorneys’ fees are included as part of the total sum for 
which judgment may be entered,”263 Bevard allowed the defen-
dant to use that ambiguity to its advantage. It is the plaintiff 
who was penalized, having to “speculate whether the offer was 
intended to include attorneys’ fees or not.”264 
 
 260. Bevard, 127 F.3d at 1148. 
 261. Indeed, the Bevard court’s conclusion that the offer there is silent as 
to attorneys’ fees is itself questionable, given that the offer provides for $8001 
“including any recoverable costs and fees,” which, arguably, unambiguously 
includes attorneys’ fees. See id. at 1149 (Norris, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (“Here, [the defendant’s] offer was not silent as to fees. It expressly 
included ‘any recoverable costs and fees.’ It is hard to imagine what ‘recover-
able fees’ [the defendant] intended to include in the offer if not recoverable at-
torneys’ fees.” (emphasis added)). 
 262. See Nusom, 122 F.3d at 834 (“[D]efendants bear the brunt of uncer-
tainty but easily may avoid it by making explicit that their offers do or do not 
permit plaintiffs to recover attorneys fees.”); Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 
F.2d 877, 880–81 (9th Cir. 1991) (placing the burden on the defendant to “pro-
vide clear evidence that demonstrates that an ambiguous clause was intended 
by both parties to provide for the waiver of fees”). While the court in Bevard 
quoted Nusom’s statement regarding defendants bearing the “brunt of uncer-
tainty,” the court does not appear to have followed the rationale expressed in 
this statement. Bevard, 127 F.3d at 1148. 
 263. Nusom, 122 F.3d at 834. 
 264. Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 
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One court has described the defendant’s opportunity to ar-
gue after-the-fact about what its offer meant as allowing the 
defendant to “have its cake and eat it too.”265 Rather than hav-
ing to live with its drafting choices, the defendant gets to “sit 
back and interpret the offer based upon the factual circum-
stances it finds itself in.”266 The court in Rateree v. Rockett 
posed the following scenario to highlight the defendant’s ad-
vantage: 
[A] likely scenario would have been that if Plaintiffs had rejected the 
offer and received a verdict of anything less than $71,000 at trial, the 
Defendant would have argued that the plain language of the offer ex-
cluded fees and costs, and therefore Plaintiff would be responsible for 
the costs incurred after rejection of the offer.267 
In addition to the unfairness to plaintiffs, allowing defen-
dants to pick and choose the meaning of the offer depending on 
the context directly contravenes Rule 68’s purpose of “avoiding 
protracted litigation.”268 Instead of ending the litigation, the 
Rule 68 offer spawns its own branch of litigation. If the door is 
open to collateral litigation, there will at least be one party that 
will seek to challenge the terms of the offer after the fact. 
 
1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 265. Rateree v. Rockett, 668 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1987). For a dis-
cussion of why placing such uncertainty on the plaintiff is unfair, see Webb v. 
James, 147 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1998), stating that “because rejection of the 
offer can have serious consequences for the [offeree], courts have rightly been 
reluctant to allow [offerors] to challenge the meaning of an offer of judgment, 
either before or after acceptance.” 
 266. Rateree, 668 F. Supp. at 1159. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., Webb, 147 F.3d at 621 (“We believe there is an additional 
reason [besides fairness concerns regarding the plaintiff ] for district courts to 
refuse to consider challenges to the terms of a Rule 68 offer. Such challenges 
undermine the [r]ule’s purpose of encouraging settlement and avoiding pro-
tracted litigation.”); Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 843 N.E.2d 706, 715 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (“[C]hallenges by the offeror to the meaning of an ac-
cepted offer of judgment tend to undermine the purpose of rule 68 to encour-
age settlement and avoid protracted litigation.”); Appellants’ Reply Brief at *8, 
Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., No. C7-01-690, 2001 WL 34727949 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 29, 2001) (“Furthermore, to allow an offer[o]r to challenge the terms 
of its offer would undermine Rule 68’s purpose of encouraging settlement and 
avoiding protracted litigation.” (citing Webb, 147 F.3d at 621)). 
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D. THE OVERALL EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY DEFEAT THE 
RULE’S PURPOSE: GUN SHY DEFENDANTS, DAUNTED PLAINTIFFS, 
AND OVERBURDENED COURTS 
The uncertainty regarding how to interpret Rule 68 offers 
has a price. It makes defendants reluctant to make Rule 68 of-
fers, lest they fall prey to one of the rule’s many pitfalls. When 
defendants do make offers, those offers often have unintended 
and unwelcome results. Without guidance from the rule itself, 
defendants draft offers that do not reflect their intentions. 
Plaintiffs, too, are affected by the rule’s uncertainty. Plaintiffs 
cannot choose to avoid the rule, and must make educated 
guesses about how a court will interpret a particular offer.269 
The end result is that cases that could have been resolved 
through Rule 68 remain unresolved because the defendant 
never makes a Rule 68 offer or because the defendant makes an 
offer that results in costly and unpredictable collateral litiga-
tion. Thus, instead of litigants “evaluat[ing] the risk and costs 
of litigation”270 as intended by the rule, litigants instead end up 
evaluating the risks and costs of Rule 68. None of these results 
makes sense for a rule designed to reduce litigation and pro-
mote settlement. 
1. Avoidance by Defendants 
The uncertainty created for defendants deters them from 
making Rule 68 offers. As the cases discussed above demon-
strate, defendants all too often discover that a court’s interpre-
tation of a Rule 68 offer differs from what the defendant in-
tended. The rule itself does not put the defendant on notice to 
the rule’s traps for the unknowing, nor is the case law a model 
of clarity. Many practice guides do not adequately advise de-
fendants of the potential pitfalls in drafting Rule 68 offers, and 
thus may mislead a defendant into making an offer that leaves 
the defendant vulnerable, particularly with regard to attorneys’ 
 
 269. One commentator analyzed some of the uncertainty surrounding Rule 
68 offers and concluded that “the uncertainties created by such ambiguity ac-
tually benefit a defendant.” Fisher, supra note 32, at 117. Even if this claim 
were true—which Parts II.B and II.C suggest is not always the case—it still 
would not be an excuse for leaving the rule as it is. This type of uncertainty is 
not part of the intent of the rule and is counter to the rule’s purpose to encour-
age reasonable settlements, not settlements coerced by the uncertainty of a 
poorly drafted rule. 
 270. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
2007] REWRITING RULE 68 917 
 
fees.271 Given the uncertainty, defendants can and will avoid a 
rule that seems arbitrary or overly complicated.272 Those de-
fendants who do make Rule 68 offers must conduct consider-
able research to make sure the offer is drafted to reflect the de-
fendant’s intent. Ultimately, the uncertainties in the rule 
undermine the very financial efficiencies that the rule was in-
tended to promote. 
It is doubtful that only defendants who are uninformed as 
to the rule attempt avoid it. Even the informed yet prudent de-
fendant must consider the risk that the court will misinterpret 
an offer (along with the costs of researching and drafting the 
offer’s language) and weigh that risk against the expected bene-
fit.273 Any risk may be too much if the expected payoff is low. 
And even a substantial expected payoff—such as cutting offthe 
plaintiff ’s attorneys’ fees—may not be enough to induce the de-
fendant to make an offer. Even in cases in which the expected 
payoff for the defendant would seem to be high, such as cases 
involving fee-shifting statutes, defendants have ended up worse 
off from having to pay more than they expected.274 Such “un-
 
 271. For example, a leading pretrial advocacy textbook contains a discus-
sion of Rule 68 as well as a sample form to use in drafting a Rule 68 offer. See 
THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 385 (6th ed. 2005). Although the text makes 
clear the need to specify whether attorneys’ fees are part of the offer, the sam-
ple form makes no reference to attorneys’ fees. Thus, defendants who draft of-
fers using that form may encounter the types of problems faced by the defen-
dants in Webb and Utility Automation 2000. See id. 
 272. Given Rule 68’s cursory form and the fact that it is not taught in most 
law schools, some defense attorneys may not use the rule because they do not 
know about it. At a recent symposium addressing Rule 68, the discussion 
“prompted repeated suggestions that one reason for the relatively infrequent 
use of Rule 68 offers is that many defense lawyers do not know about Rule 68.” 
Cooper, supra note 13, at 849. 
 273. For example, had the defense carried the day in Wilson v. Nomura Se-
curities International, Inc., discussed supra in Part II.C.2.a.ii, the sophisti-
cated defense attorneys likely would have wished they had avoided the rule. 
Indeed, because of the current rule’s various pitfalls, some found through care-
ful research and some yet-to-be-discovered, attorneys who are aware of rulings 
like Wilson likely will think twice before making offers under the rule. 
 274. One prominent practice guide advises defendants: “If you’re drafting 
an offer of judgment, don’t leave these matters in doubt. Lack of clarity ex-
poses your client to potentially greater liability.” SCHWARZER ET AL., supra 
note 222, § 15:178.3. As this Article demonstrates, that statement could be re-
vised to instead say, “Lack of clarity from the rule exposes your client to poten-
tially greater liability.” 
Also, the risk that defendants weigh is not just the risk that the offer will 
be misinterpreted. A defendant’s attorney necessarily also weighs the risk that 
he will be faced with a malpractice action based upon his Rule 68 offer—a risk 
that probably does not exist if the attorney does not make the offer. Indeed, a 
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foreseen liability” acts to “discourage settlements and, thus, 
highly frustrate[s] the policy behind Rule 68.”275 
2. Unfairness to the Plaintiff 
The inconsistencies and uncertainties described in the 
cases above show a problem in the rule that cannot simply be 
dismissed as a defendant’s problem. Even if it were within the 
power of defendants to fix the problem by drafting clear of-
fers—a dubious assumption given the rule’s lack of guidance to 
litigants and courts alike—their failure to do so would still 
cause problems for the plaintiffs and courts left to evaluate 
poorly drafted offers. While defendants, at least in theory, can 
“preempt Rule 68 disputes,” plaintiffs cannot.276 Plaintiffs are 
stuck with defendants’ drafting choices and cannot, as in typi-
cal settlement discussions, exchange drafts of the settlement 
offer’s language. 
The lack of clarity in the rule places plaintiffs in a double 
bind when an offer is unclear as to fees: Does a plaintiff accept 
the offer, on the gamble that she will be able to recover fees in 
addition to it? Or does she reject the offer, only later to discover 
that it did not, in the court’s view, include fees? In the latter 
scenario, the interpretation of the offer as not including attor-
neys’ fees might be the trigger for Rule 68’s cost-shifting 
mechanism to apply.277 Any uncertainty about how a court will 
interpret a Rule 68 offer that is silent as to fees potentially 
leaves a plaintiff in “the position of guessing what a court will 
later hold the offer means.”278 
Even in situations in which a plaintiff ’s educated guess 
turns out to be correct, the costs of the rule’s uncertainty still 
 
good defense to a malpractice case seeking damages from an attorneys’ failure 
to file a Rule 68 offer is that given the uncertainties existing in the application 
of the rule, the defendant’s counsel was exercising prudence. 
 275. Blumel v. Mylander, 165 F.R.D. 113, 116 (M.D. Fla. 1996). 
 276. Nordby v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Co., 199 F.3d 390, 391–92 (7th 
Cir. 1999); see also Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 
298 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir. 2002) (admonishing that defendants could “eas-
ily preempt [collateral litigation about the terms of the offer] by clearly stating 
their intent in the offer of judgment”). 
 277. Specifically, a plaintiff who recovers a judgment at trial that is more 
than the amount of the offer might be surprised to find that the rule is trig-
gered nonetheless because the relevant comparison is the judgment plus the 
attorneys’ fees accumulated at the time of the rejected offer. See, e.g., Bevard 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 127 F.3d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra Part 
II.C.3 (discussing Bevard). 
 278. Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 1998). 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
2007] REWRITING RULE 68 919 
 
exist. First, even in cases in which the expected recovery is 
relatively small, plaintiffs must expend considerable attorneys’ 
fees and costs simply to analyze the court’s likely application of 
the rule to a given offer. These costs are particularly high for 
the plaintiff whose counsel does not regularly litigate cases in 
which Rule 68 is invoked.279 Indeed the worst-case scenario, 
and one that likely exists given the rule’s lack of notice, is one 
in which the plaintiff ’s counsel accepts or rejects an offer un-
aware of the question of whether it includes costs and attor-
neys’ fees.280 Second, even for the plaintiff whose lawyer does 
sufficient research, considerable uncertainty still exists in a 
given case because of the fact-based approach that many courts 
take in construing Rule 68 offers. How, for example, can a 
plaintiff know how a court will construe an offer for a certain 
sum “with costs” or an offer that is silent as to fees when nei-
ther the rule or courts have provided a bright-line test? 
And even bright lines sometimes elicit their own problems. 
In trying to create bright lines by issuing warnings directed 
toward defendants, courts may unintentionally create more un-
certainty for plaintiffs. For example, a litigant who took liter-
ally a court’s warning that “offers must explicitly include refer-
ence to attorneys’ fees” would almost certainty have 
misevaluated the offer presented in Nordby.281 And a plaintiff 
who researched the case law enough to learn that fees are re-
coverable in addition to an offer so long as the offer did not 
“clearly specify that [it] include[d] attorney[s’] fees” would miss 
the mark in a fees-as-costs case in which costs were included in 
the offer.282 
 
 279. Cooper, supra note 13, at 848–49. 
 280. Id. at 849 (discussing in the context of cost-shifting sanctions the con-
cern that plaintiffs are not put on notice of costs and fees issues). 
 281. For example, the California Practice Guide, in discussing lump-sum 
offers, states that “the offer must specify that it includes costs and fees.” 
SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 222, § 15:155.2. While the guide goes on to cite 
Nordby as holding that there is “no need to specify fees” when the offer is for 
“all counts of the complaint,” id., litigants who are unfamiliar with the rule 
will likely fail to consider the nuances but instead look for the bright lines that 
at least seem to provide clarity. 
 282. Sampson v. Embassy Suites, Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-7794, 1998 WL 
726649, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1998). While the focus in this subpart is on re-
covery of fees when fees are defined as separate from costs, certainly the 
plaintiff would be wrong in her assessment if such fees were defined as costs 
and the offer was deemed inclusive of costs. Thus, for example, a plaintiff who 
accepted an offer for “$5000 including costs” upon the belief that because it did 
not “specify that [it] includes attorneys’ fees,” see id., would be unpleasantly 
surprised to learn that attorneys’ fees were included as part of costs and thus 
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3. Costs to Courts 
Rule 68’s lack of clarity regarding how offers should be 
construed imposes costs on the court as well as litigants. Be-
cause the rule’s language provides little guidance, litigants who 
are uncertain as to the meaning of particular offers under Rule 
68 must turn to courts to resolve their disputes. And courts, for 
their part, often resolve such disputes by resorting to case-by-
case rulings. The end result is frequent, and often extensive, 
collateral litigation about the meaning of Rule 68 offers.283 For 
an already burdened judicial system, litigation arising from a 
settlement rule that is intended to curb litigation is both ironic 
and disappointing. 
 In addition to the costs of litigation, the uncertainties 
under the current rule have other less tangible, but neverthe-
less serious, costs to courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are intended to create uniformity in the federal judicial 
system.284 As leading commentators in the area have pointed 
out, the benefits of uniformity under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are several: fairness to litigants, such that the costs 
of litigation do not vary greatly by district; avoidance of forum 
shopping; and standardization, which enables lawyers easily to 
practice law across districts.285 This last benefit is especially 
noteworthy in the context of Rule 68. Specifically: 
If rules vary among districts, lawyers must expend substantial time 
learning the individual rules for each district. Inevitably, lawyers will 
sometimes err in dealing with unfamiliar procedures, leading to addi-
tional court time in admonishing attorneys and enforcing compli-
ance.286 
Given the complexity of and inconsistencies in the law sur-
rounding Rule 68 offers, it is not surprising that courts do in 
fact expend considerable time enforcing Rule 68.287 It also is not 
 
could not be recovered in addition to the Rule 68 offer amount. 
 283. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 102–05 (discussing Richard-
son v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 284. Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of the 
Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995) (describing the primary ar-
gument that influenced the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
“procedure ought to be the same across the federal courts and the cases those 
courts hear[]”). 
 285. See id. at 782 (discussing threats to uniformity stemming from the 
proliferation of local rules). 
 286. Id. at 783. 
 287. See supra Part II.B–C. 
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surprising that—given the rule’s optional nature for defen-
dants—litigants often avoid the rule. 
4. Overall, Lack of Certainty Undermines the Rule’s Purpose 
For a rule established to foster settlement and reduce the 
burdens of litigation, the rule’s lack of clarity with regard to of-
fers undermines its very purpose. Simply because certain as-
pects of litigation are inherently risky and uncertain does not 
excuse building such uncertainty into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.288 Allowing this uncertainty is particularly un-
desirable if the purpose of Rule 68 is not just to act as a private 
benefit to litigants but also to provide a public benefit to the le-
gal system. 
III.  LIVING UP TO THE PROMISE:  
A PROPOSAL TO REVISE AND CLARIFY RULE 68  
WITH REGARD TO OFFERS   
With soaring litigation expenses and burgeoning court 
dockets, Rule 68 theoretically should serve as a useful tool for 
litigants and courts alike.289 In practice, though, the rule serves 
as a rarely used tool that, even when employed, ends up spawn-
ing the very litigation that it is intended to decrease. The cases 
above demonstrate that the failure of litigants to use the rule, 
as well as the collateral litigation that results when they do, 
stems largely from a lack of clarity in the rule itself.290 Much of 
this ambiguity exists with regard to the meaning of Rule 68 of-
fers. Litigants who are uncertain about how an offer will be in-
terpreted will be disinclined to make such offers. Likewise, liti-
gants who make, accept, or reject an offer, only later to discover 
that they were mistaken in their understanding of that offer, 
will litigate the matter. All of this uncertainty has a cost, both 
to the litigants and to the courts. 
The question becomes how best to diminish the current un-
certainties surrounding interpretation of Rule 68 offers.291 Any 
 
 288. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Marek, noted the need for uniformity 
in application of the Federal Rules, stating: “As with all of the Federal Rules, 
the drafters intended Rule 68 to have uniform, consistent application in all 
proceedings in federal court.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
 289. See Latin, supra note 9, at 703. 
 290. See supra Part II.B–C. 
 291. This Article focuses on making the law governing the terms of Rule 68 
offers clear, such that defendants are willing to make Rule 68 offers and plain-
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such solution must decrease uncertainty at the points when it 
matters most—when the defendant is contemplating making a 
Rule 68 offer and when the plaintiff is contemplating accepting 
a Rule 68 offer. Both parties must be able to predict how a 
court will later interpret the offer. Such predictability is espe-
cially important concerning whether an offer will be deemed in-
clusive of costs and attorneys’ fees. At the same time, any 
amendment to the rule must not undermine the rule’s purpose 
in other ways.292 Thus, the solution lies in creating clarity 
within the rule itself, such that parties are not left to guess how 
a court will later interpret an offer under the rule. 
Accordingly, the rule should be revised to make clear how 
offers will be interpreted. At the very least, the rule must alert 
parties to the pivotal issues regarding costs and attorneys’ fees, 
as well as the validity of offers. The rule should be sufficiently 
user-friendly so that litigants do not need to expend excessive 
time and resources to determine whether an offer includes or 
excludes costs and attorneys’ fees. Instead, the rule itself 
should provide a clear test for litigants to determine whether 
courts would interpret a given offer as inclusive of costs and 
fees. 
A. SPECIFIC CHANGES TO RULE 68’S PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
OFFERS 
The proposed revised rule provides two general ways for 
defendants to make Rule 68 offers: “damages-only” offers and 
 
tiffs are able to fairly assess such offers. It may also be the case—as several 
commentators have suggested—that other aspects of the rule need to be 
amended, such as the incentives with regard to consequences under Rule 68 
when the rule is triggered. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 55, at 441 (propos-
ing a percentage-based approach). Other proposals suggest that plaintiffs, as 
well as defendants, should be able to make offers under Rule 68. See WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 3, § 3001.2 n.2, at 80 (listing state provisions that allow 
plaintiffs to make offers of judgment); Geoffrey Miller, An Economic Analysis 
of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 125 (1986). Yet other proposals have looked 
at the economic impact of the current Rule 68 on wealth distribution between 
plaintiffs and defendants. See Simon, supra note 51, at 9. All of these propos-
als take the certainty of the offer as a starting point, and thus have a different 
focus than this Article. These proposals generally are consistent with the pro-
posal suggested in this Article, but are not necessary to achieve the baseline 
benefits set forth here. This Article’s proposals eliminate practical barriers to 
defendants making Rule 68 offers and eliminate the unfairness and collateral 
litigation that result from uncertainty about how courts will interpret offers. 
 292. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 13, at 848 (cautioning against the “lure of 
drafting ever more detailed rules” and instead urging that rules be crafted “to 
declare general principles that guide judicial discretion”). 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
2007] REWRITING RULE 68 923 
 
“lump-sum” offers. The proposed rule establishes the “damages-
only” offer as the default. As such, all offers will be interpreted 
to be “damages only,” and thus not inclusive of costs and attor-
neys’ fees unless they strictly comply with the opt-out provision 
regarding lump-sum offers. In addition, under the proposed 
rule, a lump-sum offer by definition must include not only 
costs, but any applicable attorneys’ fees as well.293 Thus, under 
either type of offer—damages-only or lump-sum—costs and at-
torneys’ fees are treated the same, thereby eliminating the 
need to differentiate between those fees that are defined as 
costs and those that are not. 
B. PROPOSED REVISED RULE 68 
Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68: Offer of  
Judgment294 
(a) At any time more than 10 days before the trial be-
gins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon 
the adverse party an damages only or lump sum offer to 
allow judgment to be taken against the defending party 
for the money or property to the effect specified in the 
offer, with costs then accrued. 
(b) If within 10 days after the service of the offer the ad-
verse party serves written notice that the offer is ac-
cepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of 
acceptance together with proof of service thereof and 
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. 
(c) An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and 
evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding 
to determine costs. 
(d) All offers must be construed as “damages only” 
unless the text of the offer complies with part (h) of this 
Rule. Offers may be for monetary and/or nonmonetary 
relief. 
(e) Damages-only offers must be construed as inclusive 
of any applicable prejudgment interest then accrued and 
 
 293. Under the current rule, a lump-sum offer must include attorneys’ fees 
in fees-as-costs cases but not in fees-as-separate-from-costs cases. See supra 
notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 294. The text of the proposed revised rule indicates changes to the current 
rule as follows: strikeouts show where text was deleted from the current rule, 
underlined text shows additions to the rule, and text neither underlined nor 
stricken is the original text. 
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as not inclusive of costs then accrued or any applicable 
attorneys’ fees then accrued. 
(f ) Upon acceptance of an offer, the adverse party’s costs 
then accrued and applicable attorneys’ fees then accrued 
shall be added to the offer, and judgment entered ac-
cordingly. The only exception to this provision is pursu-
ant to an offer made under Rule 68(h) below, to which 
no additional amount shall be added. 
(g) If the judgment295 finally obtained by the offeree is 
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay 
the costs incurred after the making of the offer. 
(h) For an offer to be construed as a “lump-sum” offer, 
the offeror must state in the text of its offer the follow-
ing: “This offer is being made pursuant to Rule 68(h) 
and represents a lump-sum offer inclusive of prejudg-
ment interest then accrued, costs then accrued, and any 
applicable attorneys’ fees then accrued.” 
(i) “Applicable attorneys’ fees then accrued” are any at-
torneys’ fees to which the adverse party is entitled by 
statute, rule, or contract for one or more of the claims 
resolved by an offer made under this Rule. 
 (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Rule, the 
court must still decide under a damages-only offer what 
attorneys’ fees are applicable under the relevant author-
ity. 
 (2) Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to create a 
substantive right to attorneys’ fees, not already provided 
for under the applicable substantive law. 
 (3) The term “applicable attorneys’ fees then accrued” 
includes any litigation expenses to which the adverse 
party is entitled. 
(j) An offer made and/or accepted under this Rule does 
not constitute an admission of liability. An offeror may 
include language in the text of the offer to this effect. 
 
 295. While this Article focuses on amending Rule 68 to provide clarity at 
the offer stage, it is worth noting that the term “judgment” in Rule 68, which 
arises at the comparison stage, contains its own ambiguity. This ambiguity 
could be resolved by amending the rule to make clear what is implicit in 
Marek—that the “judgment” to which an unaccepted offer is compared in-
cludes not only the plaintiff ’s verdict but the plaintiff ’s pre-offer costs and, 
when applicable, pre-offer attorneys’ fees. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6–
7 (1985); Lewis & Eaton, supra note 49, at 733. 
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(k) The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does 
not preclude a subsequent offer. 
(l) Unexpired offers are not revocable. 
(m) When the liability of one party to another has been 
determined by verdict or order of judgment, but the 
amount or extent of the liability remains to be deter-
mined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable 
may make an offer of judgment, which shall have the 
same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served 
within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to 
the commencement of hearings to determine the amount 
or extent of liability. 
C. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED RULE 
The proposed rule will benefit litigants and courts alike. 
Rather than requiring extreme “caution and care by counsel,” 
the proposed rule provides counsel with certainty in drafting 
and evaluating Rule 68 offers.296 It does this by providing clar-
ity in the rule itself. At the front end, the proposed revised rule 
will allow litigants to draft and evaluate Rule 68 offers with 
awareness of what is required by the rule, and with particular 
awareness of the role of costs and attorneys’ fees in relation to 
the offer. Thus, collateral litigation regarding Rule 68 offers 
will be greatly curbed because, rather than analyzing the 
meaning of unlimited drafting possibilities, parties and courts 
will learn that Rule 68 offers must take one of two forms. 
Second, in those occasions in which litigants do dispute an 
offer’s terms, the proposed revised rule will provide courts with 
a bright-line test to apply in resolving disputes. A defendant 
who, for example, wishes to argue that its offer was for a lump-
sum amount, notwithstanding the fact that it purported to ex-
clude attorneys’ fees, will, as always, be able to have a bite at 
the apple. But because the plain language of Rule 68 gives 
courts no discretion to treat an offer as lump-sum unless it 
complies with the express requirements of the rule, courts pre-
sumably would deal with such a challenge summarily and in-
expensively. The sections that follow explain the particular 
benefits of the proposed revised rule, demonstrating that the 
uncertainties revealed in Parts II.B and II.C are resolved by 
rewriting the rule. The net effects of the revised rule’s greater 
 
 296.  Sampson v. Embassy Suites, Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-7794, 1998 WL 
726649, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1998). 
SHELTON_5FMT 4/13/2007  11:21:15 AM 
926 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:865 
 
clarity would be increased use of the rule by defendants, fair-
ness to plaintiffs who must respond to offers under the rule, 
and less collateral litigation. 
1. Clarity Regarding Components of a Rule 68 Offer 
Perhaps because the rule was drafted decades ago, it does 
not alert litigants to the basic components of a Rule 68 offer. 
The revised rule provides clarity for litigants in this regard. 
Specifically, the text of the proposed rule alerts litigants to the 
required components of a Rule 68 offer with particular atten-
tion to the role of costs and attorneys’ fees in the offer.297 
Such clarity is important for two reasons. First, defendants 
who do not understand the basic components of a Rule 68 offer 
tend either to avoid the rule or to draft offers that do not in-
clude such components, or at least do not include them 
clearly.298 Moreover, the current rule is self-defeating to the ex-
tent that its purpose of promoting settlement and decreasing 
litigation is undermined by defendants’ hesitancy to use it and 
by the rule’s propensity to spawn collateral litigation.299 Sec-
ond, clarity in the rule about the components of Rule 68 offers 
is important to plaintiffs as well as defendants. Plaintiffs who 
must respond to a Rule 68 offer need to understand what is at 
stake and what effect a particular offer has on costs and attor-
neys’ fees.300 
While it is true, as some courts have suggested, that a liti-
gant who conducts basic research on Rule 68 would uncover the 
Marek decision, that fact alone would simply alert the litigant 
to the potential for attorneys’ fees to be treated as part of 
costs.301 The litigant still would need to conduct further re-
search into other bodies of law to discern whether costs in that 
particular case are inclusive of fees. Moreover, focusing on 
what litigants could or should uncover in their research raises 
 
 297. The revised rule also clarifies that prejudgment interest is included as 
part of a Rule 68 offer, whether the offer is for damages-only or lump-sum. 
While this is not an area of significant confusion under the current rule, it 
should be made clear in the revised rule. See, e.g., Henderson v. Horace Mann 
Ins. Co., No. 03-CV-0526-CVE-PJC, 2006 WL 1878897, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 
6, 2006) (citing Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 527 (10th Cir. 
1992)) (holding that an offer that did not mention prejudgment interest was 
inclusive of such interest). 
 298. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 299. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of Rule 68’s purpose. 
 300. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 301. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985); supra Part I.A. 
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the question of why the rule itself should not provide such basic 
illumination. Not all cases involve large dollar amounts, and 
not all litigants are repeat players within the Rule 68 universe. 
Why should a rule intended to decrease costs instead require 
litigants to expend resources becoming veritable experts on the 
rule? Moreover, because the rule is intended to serve the public 
function of promoting settlements generally, not simply to per-
form a private function for individual litigants,302 the public 
good is served by alerting litigants to the components of Rule 
68 offers. 
2. Clarity Regarding Whether Particular Offers Are Valid 
Litigants know that absent a valid offer, Rule 68 has no 
impact. But under the current rule, litigants do not know what 
is required in order for an offer to be deemed valid.303 This un-
certainty results in underutilization of the rule as well as diffi-
culties in assessing offers that are made. The text of the revised 
rule addresses this problem by explicitly providing guidance in 
three areas in which significant confusion exists regarding the 
validity of offers. 
Specifically, part (j) of the rule provides that a Rule 68 offer 
does not constitute an admission of liability, thus eliminating 
the need for defendants to specify whether the offer is an ad-
mission or not. In addition, part (l) of the rule provides that 
Rule 68 offers are never revocable. Finally, part (d) states that 
an offer may include monetary and/or nonmonetary relief, mak-
ing clear that either or both is sufficient. 
All of these revisions enable litigants to know at the front 
end whether courts will deem particular offers valid. The result 
is that defendants are more likely to make offers under the 
rule, because they are confident their offers will not later be in-
validated. The revisions also create a more level playing field 
for plaintiffs, who have no input into an offer’s language and 
should not be required to second-guess whether a particular of-
fer will be deemed valid. 
The potential downside of these revisions is slight. First, a 
defendant who may want to admit liability, because he thinks a 
plaintiff might value such an admission, cannot factor the ad-
 
 302. See supra notes 16–18. 
 303. See supra Part II.B. Some observers have argued that the rule should 
be revised so that it does not apply to class actions. This issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For a discussion of policy arguments surrounding class 
actions and Rule 68, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3001.1, at 76–78. 
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mission into the value of the offer. However, nothing prevents a 
defendant from making the same settlement offer, with an ad-
mission of liability, apart from Rule 68. If the offer is accepted, 
it makes little difference whether it is accepted pursuant to 
Rule 68 or not, because cost-shifting implications are triggered. 
Second, a defendant who, perhaps because of newly discovered 
information, wants to revoke a Rule 68 offer within the ten-day 
acceptance period cannot do so. While circumstances of obvious 
clerical error304 may make this provision troubling, the reality 
is that disallowing revocations makes defendants no worse off 
than plaintiffs. Just as a plaintiff cannot withdraw her accep-
tance of a Rule 68 offer upon discovering new information that 
makes the offer less appealing, the defendant too must remain 
bound by its offer for the ten-day period. 
3. Clarity Regarding Whether an Offer Is Inclusive of Costs 
Too much uncertainty exists regarding whether offers are 
inclusive of costs. While uncertainty is reduced by alerting liti-
gants to the components of Rule 68 offers,305 this alone is not 
enough. Simply put, there are too many potentialities in Rule 
68 offers to achieve clarity under the current rule.306 And, 
unlike typical settlement offers, in which litigants can mutually 
resolve uncertainties at the drafting stage, the uncertainties in 
Rule 68 offers instead are resolved through collateral litiga-
tion.307 
The revised rule eliminates the confusion that arises from 
the various drafting potentialities by limiting the types of Rule 
68 offers a party can make. Specifically, the rule allows de-
fendants to make only two types of offers: damages-only offers 
and lump-sum offers. In addition, the revised rule establishes 
damages-only offers as the default. Thus, unless the defendant 
uses the specific language contained in part (h) of the rule to 
opt out of the default and thus make a lump-sum offer, the offer 
will uniformly be construed as a damages-only offer. 
 
 304. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 96–101 (discussing Cesar v. 
Rubie’s Costume Co., 219 F.R.D. 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 305. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 306. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the confusion that arises in cases in 
which offers are arguably ambiguous as well as cases in which offers are silent 
with regard to costs). Even if courts construed such offers uniformly—which 
these cases suggest is not the reality—differences in an offer’s language or the 
circumstances of a particular case may engender uncertainty regarding the 
meaning of a particular offer. See id. 
 307. See supra Part II.B–C. 
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The benefits of restricting the types of Rule 68 offers de-
fendants can make are several. First, the revised rule elimi-
nates the need to construe on a case-by-case basis the variety of 
offers that arise in Rule 68 cases. Thus, instead of the current 
uncertainty that arises when an offer is silent as to costs, the 
revised rule makes clear that an offer must not only mention 
costs but also comply with the other requirements of part (h) in 
order to be deemed inclusive of costs. Second, and related, the 
revised rule provides clarity to litigants at the front end, rather 
than in the course of collateral litigation when it is too late. It 
should be clear to defendants drafting offers, and to plaintiffs 
evaluating offers, whether the offer is lump-sum or not. 
Third, revising the rule helps ensure that litigants making 
and evaluating Rule 68 offers have the same understanding of 
the terms of the offer, thereby eliminating the kinds of sur-
prises that too often arise in Rule 68 cases.308 While it is coun-
terproductive to the rule’s purpose of encouraging settlements 
to require an actual meeting of the minds, the clarity and speci-
ficity of the revised rule at least make it more likely that the 
litigants will have mutual understanding of the meaning of the 
offer. This characteristic alone will greatly encourage the use of 
the rule by defendants309 and will make the rule’s use fair for 
plaintiffs.  
Fourth, the bright-line nature of the revised rule elimi-
nates any need for courts to consider extrinsic evidence in con-
struing Rule 68 offers. This result makes sense for multiple 
reasons, not the least of which is that the consideration of ex-
trinsic evidence is expensive and inherently uncertain. More-
over, the consideration of such evidence after-the-fact leaves 
plaintiffs vulnerable because they must evaluate and decide 
upon the meaning of a Rule 68 offer even though a court has 
not yet decided that meaning.310 
Undoubtedly, even under the proposed revised rule some 
defendants still will make mistakes when drafting their Rule 
68 offers. A defendant might make an offer that it intends to be 
 
 308. For a discussion of the various possible understandings litigants may 
have when an offer is silent regarding attorneys’ fees, see Wilson v. Nomura 
Securities International, Inc., 361 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 309. As discussed in Part II.D.1, defendants who have been burned by the 
rule, or those who anticipate that possibility, will elect not to use the rule 
rather than risk unintended consequences. 
 310. See supra Part II.C.1.b (discussing why courts should be reluctant to 
consider extrinsic evidence in the context of Rule 68 offers). 
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lump-sum, but that does not comply with part (h). Under the 
plain language of the rule, such an offer will be deemed to be 
for damages only and, if accepted, costs and any applicable at-
torneys’ fees will be added to it. While this result is unfortunate 
for the particular defendant, it is necessary if the rule is to pro-
vide the level of certainty necessary to enable plaintiffs to fairly 
evaluate offers and to cut off collateral litigation. The alterna-
tive—leaving in place the current uncertainty about whether 
an offer is lump-sum or not and thus making the plaintiff guess 
as to how the court will construe it—is more unfair and more 
burdensome on courts. 
Similarly, it is true that eliminating the lump-sum option 
altogether would add even more clarity at the offer stage. How-
ever, that change would not be desirable. Perhaps most impor-
tant, preserving a defendant’s ability to make a lump-sum set-
tlement offer is necessary for the simple reason that many 
defense attorneys would not make Rule 68 offers if such offers 
left the issue of fees open. For example, one prominent defense 
attorney has stated that he has never drafted a Rule 68 offer 
exclusive of attorneys’ fees, because it would be too much of a 
“wild card” to leave the issue of attorneys’ fees up to the 
court.311 On the other hand, another prominent defense attor-
ney has stated that “the preferred way that we like to make of-
fers of judgment is a sum certain plus reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs incurred to date to be determined by the 
court.”312 Thus, in order to maximize the use of the rule, any 
proposed change should keep both options open, as the pro-
posed revised rule does. 
4. Clarity Regarding Whether an Offer Is Inclusive of 
Attorneys’ Fees 
Because the rule’s value to defendants is greatest when at-
torneys’ fees are at issue, defendants are most likely to make 
Rule 68 offers in cases in which a fee-shifting statute is in-
volved.313 Yet the current rule’s failure to mention attorneys’ 
fees at all creates considerable uncertainty regarding how to 
construe offers in fee-shifting cases. This intersection of the 
 
 311. Symposium, supra note 166, at 780 (comment by Mr. Richard Alfred). 
 312. Id. at 779 (comment by Mr. John Kennedy) (suggesting that the ad-
vantage of making the offer exclusive of fees is that “all you have to put your 
science on is the dollar sum, the damage sum, to measure against the trial re-
sult” instead of “trying to guess at what those fees are”). 
 313. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, § 68.02[4], at 68-13. 
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rule’s lack of clarity regarding attorneys’ fees combined with its 
increased use in fee-shifting cases hasled to significant uncer-
tainty on the part of litigants and has resulted in complex col-
lateral litigation. 
As described in Part II.C.2 above, the sources of litigants’ 
uncertainty about whether attorneys’ fees are included in the 
offer are several. Sometimes litigants are unaware that attor-
neys’ fees are implicated in any way by Rule 68.314 Yet more of-
ten the confusion stems from uncertainty about how the under-
lying fee-shifting statute characterizes attorneys’ fees,315 and 
about whether attorneys’ fees may be recovered when the offer 
is silent as to fees.316 These uncertainties are inherent under 
the current rule, in which the interpretation of offers is boot-
strapped on to the underlying fee-shifting statute. 
The revised rule reduces uncertainty regarding attorneys’ 
fees by alerting litigants to the issue of attorneys’ fees and by 
specifying what an offer must say in order to be construed as 
inclusive of such fees. Yet these two changes alone, which are 
discussed in detail above in Part III.C.1 and III.C.3, are not 
sufficient to resolve the uncertainties that now accompany Rule 
68 offers in fees-shifting cases.317 Greater clarification is 
needed because under the current rule, the meaning of a Rule 
68 offer is entirely dependent on the fee-shifting statute in-
volved.318 Thus, identical language from two Rule 68 offers is 
construed as having two different meanings simply because the 
offers were made in cases involving different fee-shifting stat-
utes.319 
 
 314. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 315. See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
 316. See supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 317. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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To eliminate this distinction without true meaning,320 
which is the source of far too much uncertainty under the cur-
rent rule, the revised rule effectively replaces the concept of 
“costs” at the offer stage with the concept of “costs and applica-
ble attorneys’ fees.” The result is that under the plain language 
of the rule, offers must be construed without regard to the un-
derlying fee statute involved.321 So, for example, a “lump-sum” 
offer must always be inclusive of applicable attorneys’ fees as 
well as costs (regardless of how the underlying fee statute de-
fines attorneys’ fees). And a damages-only offer cannot be in-
clusive of either attorneys’ fees or costs.322 
This change in the rule is particularly necessary to reduce 
collateral litigation in cases in which offers are silent with re-
gard to attorneys’ fees.323 Under the current rule, such an of-
fer’s meaning is resolved by the court, long after the plaintiff is 
required to accept or reject the offer, based upon the court’s 
conclusion as to whether the offer is ambiguous.324 And even 
 
 320. Many commentators that have considered this distinction have done 
so within the context of the cost-shifting penalties of the rule, under which the 
shifting of attorneys’ fees is dependent on the type of fee-shifting statute in-
volved. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 13, at 849. The distinction permeates the 
rule with uncertainty at the offer stage as well. While beyond the scope of this 
Article, the Marek distinction also needs to be eliminated at the cost-shifting 
phase. See id. (“No one could have intended to write a rule that cuts off post-
offer statutory attorney fees if the underlying statute characterizes fees ex-
pressly as costs, but not if the statute characterizes fees expressly as fees.”); 
supra note 122. While such a revision to the rule is not necessary in order to 
achieve clarity at the offer stage, it would address many of the same types of 
concerns raised in this Article, such as predictability to defendants, fairness to 
plaintiffs, and a reduction in collateral litigation. 
 321. Not all attorneys’ fee provisions are statutory in nature. See supra 
note 122. Fees also may be awarded pursuant to contracts. Even so, statutory 
attorney fee provisions are by far the most common fee entitlement, and thus 
this Article refers generically to such provisions. 
 322. Along these lines, the revised rule also defines attorneys’ fees as inclu-
sive of any applicable litigation expenses. See Proposed Revised Rule 68(i)(3), 
supra Part III.B. This definition makes clear that such expenses are treated as 
part of applicable attorneys’ fees for purposes of the rule, avoiding the diffi-
culty that arises when expenses such as expert fees are defined by an underly-
ing statute as part of attorneys’ fees or as a separately recoverable item. See, 
e.g., Spruill v. Winner Ford of Dover, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 94-685 MMS, 1998 WL 
186895, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 6, 1998) (noting that although expert fees are not 
traditionally part of attorneys’ fees, Title VII and § 1988 explicitly define ex-
pert fees as part of attorneys’ fees). 
 323. However, it is likely that insofar as the text of proposed revised Rule 
68 alerts defendants to the issue of attorneys’ fees, offers that are silent as to 
fees will be less commonplace. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 324. See supra Part II.C.2.b (describing cases in which uncertainty exists 
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whether a court labels an offer ambiguous is not necessarily 
conclusive of the result, given the varying consequences that 
courts attach to ambiguous offers.325 While a determination of 
ambiguity sometimes depends only on the fee-shifting statute 
at issue, at other times it depends on the particular causes of 
actions and relief specified in the complaint.326 Hence, a plain-
tiff who wants to know what meaning a court may attach to an 
offer that does not mention attorneys’ fees has to distinguish 
between language like “total settlement” versus “one total sum 
as to all counts,” as well as what the latter means if the counts 
specified in the complaint did not include a fee award.327 
None of this makes sense under any set of circumstances, 
but it is particularly troublesome in the context of a rule in-
tended to curb litigation costs. Thus, under the revised rule, 
litigants are not required to second-guess whether a court will 
deem an offer unambiguous. The rule makes clear that all of-
fers are damages only (and thus by definition not inclusive of 
costs and applicable attorneys’ fees) unless the offer strictly 
complies with the lump-sum provisions contained in part (h). 
Thus, an offer that does not mention fees by definition would 
not comply with part (h) and would be just another example of 
a damages-only offer to which applicable fees should be added if 
accepted. 
In addition, eliminating distinctions in offers based upon 
underlying fee statutes adds particular clarity in cases in which 
Rule 68 offers involve two different types of fee statutes. Under 
the current rule, considerable confusion and collateral litigation 
arises in such cases because it is unclear how a court will con-
strue an offer that “includes costs” when the case itself arises 
under two fee-shifting statutes that define costs differently. 
Namely, it is unclear in such cases whether a court will define 
costs with reference to the underlying fees-as-costs statute, the 
underlying fees-as-separate-from-costs statute, or some combi-
 
because offers are silent regarding fees). 
 325. See supra Part II.C.2.b.i (comparing Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. 
Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, 298 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2002), Radecki 
v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1988), and Basha v. Mitsubishi Motor 
Credit of America, Inc., 336 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 326. See supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 327. See supra Part II.C.2.b.ii (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
Nordby v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Co., 199 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1999), 
including dicta suggesting that the particular offer’s language might have 
been held to be ambiguous if the plaintiff had been seeking an award under 
some authority not cited in the complaint). 
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nation thereof.328 The revised rule, in eliminating the distinc-
tion between costs and fees, makes the type of underlying fee 
statute irrelevant for purposes of evaluating the offer. No un-
certainty regarding the offer need arise because under the re-
vised rule, attorneys’ fees are treated, for purposes of evaluat-
ing the offer, the same as costs, regardless of the type of fee 
statutes involved.329 Thus, the type of collateral litigation that 
arose in the Wilson case—where one claim involved a fees-as-
costs statute and another claim involved a fees-as-separate-
from-costs statute—could not arise under the revised rule. 
Rather, the inquiry would be limited to determining if the offer 
were lump-sum or not, with that answer determining whether 
attorneys’ fees were included. 
Notably, the revised rule does not permit defendants to 
make damages-only offers that are inclusive of costs but not at-
torneys’ fees. This limitation has always existed in fees-as-costs 
cases, in which attorneys’ fees by definition are part of costs.330 
However, the revised rule also extends this limitation to fees-
as-separate-from-costs cases.331 While the revision allows de-
fendants less freedom to craft individualized offers, it is neces-
sary due to the uncertainty that arises precisely because offers 
often vary so greatly. Moreover, this revision does not have a 
significant downside, because costs as a category separate from 
fees typically are not sizeable.332 Fewer options create more cer-
tainty; what some courts have hailed as flexibility under the 
 
 328. See supra Part II.C.2.a.ii (discussing Wilson v. Nomura Securities In-
ternational, Inc., 361 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 329. See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
 330. See, e.g., Bentley v. Bolger, 110 F.R.D. 108, 111–14 (C.D. Ill. 1986). 
 331. While it is possible that this provision may result in less frequent use 
of Rule 68 in fees-as-separate-from-costs cases, defendants are more likely 
simply to make lump-sum offers in such cases. Defendants making a lump-
sum offer retain the ability to set the total dollar amount as they wish. In any 
event, because attorneys’ fees do not shift in these fees-as-separate-from-costs 
cases, perhaps the effect of the rule’s clarity will be to make litigants more 
aware of what is at stake in these cases. The case law demonstrates that at 
least some defendants make offers in these cases under a misapprehension 
that applicable attorneys’ fees always shift under the rule rather than shifting 
only in fees-as-costs cases per Marek. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 12, 
§ 68.08[3], at 68-55 to -56; supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 332. Even so, nothing in Marek would prevent the rule from being 
amended to carve out a third type of offer between the damages-only offer and 
the lump-sum offer, such as a “damages and costs only” offer. Because Marek 
was based upon a statutory interpretation question, and not a constitutional 
question, the Marek Court’s interpretation of “costs” could essentially be writ-
ten out of the rule for purposes of the offer. 
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current rule333 may just as well be a buzzword for collateral 
litigation.334 Thus, the proposed revised rule benefits litigants 
and courts alike by eliminating, at least for purposes of the of-
fer, this distinction for which there is no rational basis.335 
5. Clarity Regarding the Comparison Between an Unaccepted 
Offer and the Judgment 
By creating certainty as to whether an offer is lump-sum or 
not—and what the lump sum includes—the proposed rule 
would eliminate the uncertainty that currently exists when 
courts compare an unaccepted offer with a judgment. Under the 
current rule, the same uncertainties that exist in the context of 
accepted offers occur when defendants seek to shift costs after 
trial for offers alleged to be more favorable than the judgment 
obtained.336 
As in the context of accepted offers, the proposed revised 
rule creates clarity at the comparison stage because it simpli-
fies the apples-to-apples comparison between the judgment ob-
tained and the offer. Specifically, under the revised rule the de-
fendant may make only two possible types of offers—damages-
only offers and lump-sum offers. And because of the mandatory 
language in the rule itself, litigants and courts should be able 
easily to discern which type of offer is being made.337 As such, 
the process of comparison post-trial should be straightforward. 
The costly and complicated collateral litigation concerning 
whether the rule was in fact triggered, as in B&H Manufactur-
 
 333. See Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 622–23 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a 
magic-words approach in a Rule 68 context). 
 334. It may be that, even aside from the one-sided nature of Rule 68 offers, 
the flexibility under the current Rule 68 hurts plaintiffs. See Stephen Subrin, 
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 989–90 (1987) (observing in the 
context of non-Rule 68 alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, like media-
tion and negotiation, that the weaker party often is disadvantaged by proce-
dures that are less predictable and consistent). 
 335. Unrelated to the concerns addressed in this Article, an additional 
benefit of requiring the defendant to include fees in the offer regardless of the 
fee-shifting statute is that this requirement may help avoid problems related 
to “low-ball offers.” For a discussion of problems related to “low-ball offers,” see 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3002.1, at 97–100. 
 336. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 337. For a discussion of the rule’s provisions regarding the two types of of-
fers, see supra Part III.C.3. 
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ing Co. v. Bright,338 would not exist under the revised rule. In-
stead, the language would make clear whether the offer was 
lump-sum or not, and thus it would also make clear—
regardless of the type of fee-shifting statute—whether attor-
neys’ fees were part of the offer. 
6. Comparison of the Offer’s Meaning Under the Current Rule 
Versus the Revised Rule 
In sum, the proposed revisions to the rule would inject cer-
tainty into the meaning of Rule 68 offers. Such certainty is nec-
essary in order to curb the collateral litigation that the current 
rule perpetuates and to better effectuate the rule’s purpose of 
encouraging settlements. For example, the revised rule should 
eliminate collateral litigation in which litigants wrestle over 
the arguable distinctions between an offer for a certain sum 
“with costs” versus one that instead states that it is “including 
costs.” Similarly, the rule will curtail collateral litigation about 
whether an offer for “one total sum” includes attorneys’ fees or 
not, and will also eliminate the need to look to the underlying 
fees-shifting statute in order to answer that question. 
Thus, the questions posed by the hypothetical described in 
Part II.A would all easily be resolved under the proposed re-
vised rule. In assessing the offer’s value, the plaintiff would not 
need to consider the type of fee-shifting statute involved, nor 
would she need to carefully examine discrete drafting choices 
contained in the offer. So, for example, the plaintiff would only 
need to determine whether the offer were lump-sum or not, and 
then, having so determined, make the relevant comparison. To 
the extent the defendant purported to make a lump-sum set-
tlement of sorts, say for “$175,000 in full satisfaction of all 
claims,” the mandatory language of the revised rule would treat 
that offer as damages-only unless it complied with part (h). 
  CONCLUSION   
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 was created as a tool to 
promote settlement and decrease litigation. Its need has never 
been greater as litigation expenses continue to skyrocket and 
courts’ dockets continue to increase. Yet because much uncer-
tainty surrounds how courts interpret Rule 68 offers, the rule’s 
 
 338. No. CVF016619 AWI LJO, 2006 WL 547975 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006). 
For a discussion of the complications and uncertainties arising in B&H Manu-
facturing Co., see supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
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purpose has not been achieved. The rule is rarely used and, 
when it is, collateral litigation often results. Much of this col-
lateral litigation pertains to confusion about how Rule 68 offers 
should be interpreted, with heightened confusion regarding 
whether costs or attorneys’ fees are included as part of the of-
fer. 
This Article proposes a revised rule that eliminates signifi-
cant confusion regarding the meaning of Rule 68 offers. The re-
vised rule explicitly instructs litigants regarding how Rule 68 
offers will be interpreted, so that litigants need not resort to 
expensive and time-consuming research on the nuances of in-
terpreting Rule 68 offers. Most notably, because the revised 
rule creates a bright line, clarifying that a lump-sum settle-
ment only exists if certain criteria are met, litigants should 
encounter no confusion regarding whether an offer is lump-sum 
or not. Also, because the revised rule requires that both costs 
and any allowable attorneys’ fees be treated together for pur-
poses of the offer—either as part of a lump-sum offer or to be 
added on to a damages only offer—there should be little or no 
confusion. The clarity in the rule itself should provide litigants 
with certainty about how offers will be interpreted, so that de-
fendants are not discouraged from making Rule 68 offers, and 
so that plaintiffs are able to fairly and accurately evaluate of-
fers. With key in hand to unlock the puzzle of Rule 68, litigants 
will be able to access the rule without resorting to extensive re-
search or collateral litigation. 
